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DiLuigi: Domestic Greenhouse Gas Regulation

COMMENT
KYOTO'S SO-CALLED
"FATAL FLAWS":
A POTENTIAL
SPRINGBOARD FOR DOMESTIC
GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 1997, over 180 countries, including the
United States, established the Kyoto Protocol to address global
warming. Despite its considerable involvement negotiating
and drafting the Kyoto Protocol under the Clinton Administration, the United States has since, under the George W. Bush
Administration, deemed the Protocol "fatally flawed" and has
refused to ratify it as written.! Nonetheless, the United States
has alternative means to reduce and limit domestic greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. This Comment discusses the United
States' capability to initiate a new domestic program to confront climate change in the wake of the current political stance
on environmental issues. Additionally, this Comment proposes
a program premised on market-based incentives that will serve
as a compromise between industry and the environment to ensure that the United States takes affIrmative action to reduce
and limit domestic GHG emissions.
Section II of this comment discusses the various factors
that contribute to the scientific phenomenon of global warming.
I
EPA Global Warming Publications: Bush Administration's Position (June 11,
2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/actions/us_position
/bush3cpol_0611 Ol.pdf at 14 (visited Jan. 2, 2002) !hereinafter Bush Position].
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It also addresses the scientific community's divergent positions
with respect to the causes of global warming and the extent to
which it will result in long-term adverse environmental consequences. Section III discusses the world community's development of the Kyoto Protocol in response to global warming and
the United States' opposition to its ratification. Current environmental regulatory schemes and approaches by which the
United States might domestically reduce and limit GHGs are
also considered. Section IV examines the relative advantages
and disadvantages of GHG reduction and limitation through
existing environmental regulatory schemes. This section also
considers the potential of a market based incentives approach
to environmental regulation to effectively reduce and limit
GHGs. Finally, Section V proposes a new regulatory program
designed to reduce and limit domestic GHG emissions. The
proposal's program development examines the various criteria
necessary to establish an effective environmental regulatory
program premised on market-based incentives.

II. BACKGROUND

A.

GLOBAL WARMING: WHAT IS IT?

Over the past century, the Earth's surface temperature has
increased roughly 1°F.2 The warmest ten years of the past century have occurred within the last fifteen years. 3 Unfortunately, scientists estimate that this warming trend is just beginning. 4
Scientists attribute global warming primarily to the release GHGs from anthropogenic, or human-induced, sources. 5
OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, U.S. EPA, Pub. No. 6202J at 1 (2000).
[d.
• See, e.g., 147 CONGo REC. S2300-02 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2001) !hereinafter S230002) (statement by Sen. Kerry). Sen. Kerry stated "The chair of IPCC, Dr. Robert Watson, put it his way: We see changes in climate, we believe we humans are involved, and
we're projecting future climate changes more significant over the next 100 years than
the last 100 years. And the IPCC report is only the latest in a body of science that
demands action." [d.
• 147 CONGo REC. S8894-02 (daily ed. Aug. 3 2001) !hereinafter S8894-02) (statement by Sen. Lieberman explaining IPCC report summaries). See also NASA Defmitions, available at http://asd-www.larc.nasa.gov/edulanthropodef.html (visited November 17, 2001) (explaining that anthropogenic is a word that scientists use to distinguish
2

3
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Once emitted, GHGs. remain trapped in the earth's atmosphere. GHG molecules maintain the earth's habitable temperature by absorbing infrared radiation, thereby insulating
the earth from inhospitable temperatures found outside the
earth's atmosphere. 6 Without this GHG layer, the earth's surface temperature would be almost 86°F cooler. 7 Such a temperature would not support current life forms. Likewise, if too
many GHGs enter the atmosphere, the earth's temperature
will continually rise, eventually leading to environmental catastrophes. 8
As global surface temperatures continue to rise, snowcovered lands are experiencing decreased snowfall and increased ice 10ss. 9 As a result, the earth's sea level is rising.
Over the past century, scientists have charted a rise in sea
level of up to eight inches.1° Research suggests that sea levels
could rise as much as 35 feet over the next century.ll Coastal
changes that people have introduced to the environment from processes that are natural). "An example of an anthropogenic source is an aerosol (very fme particles of dust
or smoke suspended in the atmosphere). If a scientist described an aerosol that originates from an industrial emission point, it would be considered an anthropogenic aerosol. A non-anthropogenic aerosol would be one originating, say, from a dust storm, a
volcanoe or natural burning"). Id.
a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - Climate Change
Information Kit: Climate Change Information Sheet 1, available at http://www.unfccc.
inUresource/iuckit/fact 01.html (last modified June 21,2001) !hereinafter Sheet 1).
7
Id. See also supra note 2, at 2.
8
See generally United States Environmental Protection Agency - Global Warming:
Science FAQ - Fundamentals, available at http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming
Ifaq/fundamentals.html (last modified May 14, 2001) !hereinafter FAQl (explaining
that some areas will receive more rain, while other areas will be drier. At the same
time, extreme events like floods and droughts are likely to become more frequent.
Warming will cause glaciers to melt and oceans to expand). See also 147 CONGo REC.
S3936-01 (2001) !hereinafter S3936-011 (statement by Sen. Lieberman summarizing
!PCC's Third Report on global warming). Sen. Lieberman stated that "According to
these scientific experts, unless we find ways to stop global warming, ... a large rapid
rise in temperature will profoundly affect the Earth's landscape in very real and consequential terms ... Precipitation would become more erratic, leading to droughts that
would make hunger an even more serious global problem than it is today. Diseases
such as malaria and dengue fever would spread at an accelerated pace." Id.
• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - Climate Change
Information Kit: Climate Change Information Sheet 6, available at http://www.unfccc.
inUresource/iuckitlfact 06.html (last modified June 21, 2001) !hereinafter Sheet 61.
10
Id. See also United States Environmental Protection Agency - Global Warming:
Climate Change, available at http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/climate/index.html#
Air (last modified April 6, 2001).
11
S8894-02, supra note 5 (statement by Sen. Lieberman explaining that such a rise
in sea level could submerge millions of homes and coastal property under our present-
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cities would suffer immeasurable structural and economic
losses from such a rise in sea level.
Ice loss and global warming are interrelated. 12 Under
normal circumstances, ice deflects approximately 80 percent of
solar energy from the earth, whereas water absorbs solar energy,13 As surface temperatures rise, due in part to global
warming, ice melts at a more rapid pace. With less ice to deflect solar energy, the rate at which global warming occurs also
increases. Equally, as the ice available to deflect the solar energy decreases, the waters in turn absorb more heat. Scientists
at the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) confirm that the planet's waters are taking the
brunt of the adverse affects of global warming. 14 Moreover,
while the oceans absorb heat, thereby keeping land temperatures cooler, the absorption only delays the adverse impact of
global warming on land. Due to the absorption of heat by bodies of water, scientists project that only 50 percent of the
anthropogenic effects from GHG emissions have been
accounted for through increased land temperatures. 16
Because the oceans are disproportionately absorbing the
heat produced by increasing GHG emissions, the oceans are
suffering dearly as a result. According to scientific evidence,
increased water temperatures have already led to the destruction of nearly twenty-five percent of the planet's coral reefs.16
Further, scientists project that within the next twenty years
the remaining coral reefs could be dead,17
Scientists estimate that the increasing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere could raise global temperatures by as
much as 5°F over the next 50 years.18 Scientists also predict
that by the close of the next century, global temperatures could

day oceans).
12 82300-02, supra note 4 (statement by Sen. Kerry referencing a Dec. 1999 article).
13
Id.
.. Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry summarizing a March 2000 NOAA release).
" Id.
16
Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry explaining the research results distributed at the
International Coral Reef Symposium from Oct. 2000).
17
Id.
18
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - Climate Change
Information Kit: Climate Change Information Sheet 5, available at http://www.unfccc.
intJresource/iuckitJfact 05.html (last modified June 21, 2001) [hereinafter Sheet 5].
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increase by as much as 10°F,19 If temperatures increase as
predicted, more evaporation and precipitation will inevitably
result. The predicted consequences in the United States alone
include frequent, intense rainstorms; heat waves and droughts;
and rises in coastal sea levels by as much as three feet.20
Some GHGs occur naturally while humans create others
through chemical processes. Naturally occurring GHGs include water vapor, carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), and ozone (03).21 While natural GHGs originate from earth processes, they are also induced by human activities. Human induced C02 results from burning solid waste,
fossil fuel, and wood. Human induced CH4 results from the
distribution of fossil fuel, the landfill processing of municipal
solid waste, and livestock husbandry. Human induced N20
results from solid waste and fossil fuel combustion and agricultural activities.
Four GHGs are the sole product of anthropogenic chemical
processes: halogenated fluorocarbons (HCFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride
(SFs).22 These manmade GHGs are a result of various industrial processes, final products, by-products, and waste productS. 23 Whether the GHG source occurs naturally or is anthropogenic in nature, all GHGs contribute to the planet's rising
surface temperature. Unlike naturally occurring GHGs, however, anthropogenic GHGs can be controlled, reduced, and limited by human actions.
B. GLOBAL WARMING: Is IT REALLY A PROBLEM?

While scientists generally agree that global warming is occurring, some hotly debate the causes of global warming, as
well as its potential impacts on the planet. Specifically, United
States scientists affiliated with industrial and governmental
19
S8894-02, supra note 5 (statement by Sen. Liebermann explaining the results of
the IPCC's Third Assessment Report on Global Warming). Sheet 5, supra note 18.
20
FAQ, supra note 8.
21
See supra note 2.
22
Id.
23
United States Environmental Protection Agency - Global Warming: Emissions What are Greenhouse Gases, available at http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/emissions
/index.html (last modified May 14, 2001).
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interests opposing more stringent environmental regulations
have spurred this debate. 24 As a result, well-known and highly
regarded scientists throughout the world continue to provide
differing opinions based on their scientific findings. 25 Yet, it is
clear that the majority of scientists globally acknowledge ·that
global warming is problematic, that it is worsening due to anthropogenic impacts, and that it is a condition that must be
controlled to limit adverse environmental impacts. 26
1. Scientific Support

The overwhelming majority of the scientific community believes that the research on global warming proves the global
environment will suffer adversely in the long term. Such broad
scientific and public awareness of the global warming issue is
primarily a result of the United Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).27
24 See generally, e.g., Sharon Beder, Climatic Confusion and Corporate Collusion:
Hijacking the Greenhouse Debate, available at http://www.uow.edu.aularts/sts/sbeder/
ecologist2.html (visited Mar. 16, 2002) (discussing the corporate influence over American scientists in relationship to their position on global warming). The article was
published in the March/April 1999 issue of The Ecologist.
'" See Mike Ferullo, Climate Change: Senate Panel Considers Measure to Create
National Research Strategy, 32 ER 1404 (2001) (Dr. Karl believes global warming is not
a problem). See also 147 CONGo REC. S2659-02 (2001) [hereinafter S2659-021 (statement by Mr. Peterson quoting a passage from Professor Morner, president of the International Commission and sea level researcher). But see 147 CONGo REC. S6000-02
(2001) [hereinafter S6000-021 (statement by Sen. Stevens). Dan Goldin, the Head of
the National Aeronautic and Space Administration; Scott Gudes, the acting head of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Dr. Rita Colwell, the National
Science Foundation Director; Charles Groat, Geological Survey Director; and experts
from the International Arctic Research Center and the University of Alaska's Geophysical Institute noted that recent climate change activity likely stems from a number
of factors, including natural variances and human activity. [d. Compare with supra
note 12 (statement by Sen. Kerry). Dr. Robert Watson, chair of IPCC, believes humans
are involved in global warming and projects that projects future climate changes will
be more significant over the next 100 years than the last 100 years. [d.
,. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - Third Report: Technical Summary, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htm#sprep (visited Mar.
16,2002).
27
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - Guide to the Climate Change Negotiation Process: The Climate Change Convention, available at
http://www. unfccc.intiresource/ process/components/response/respconv.html (last modified June 21, 2001) [hereinafter Negotiation Process). The FCCC was adopted in 1992
at the Rio Earth Summit to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
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The IPCC was established in 1988 and is composed of over
2000 scientists from over 100 countries. 28 The IPCC has released a number of reports citing strong evidence that the major source of global warming over the last 50 years is anthropogenic in nature. 29 The IPCC's third report on global warming,
issued early in 2001 and authored by 700 expert scientists,
concluded that unless the international community limits and
reduces GHG emissions, the earth's average temperature will
rise anywhere from 2°F to 10°F over the next century.3D Additionally, the IPCC projects that the climate changes over the
next 100 years will be more significant than those of the past
100 years. 31
In an attempt to refute the IPCC's third report, President
George W. Bush requested and received a second opinion from
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS).32 The NAS, however,
confirmed the IPCC's findings, stating:
The IPCC's conclusion that most of the observed warming of
the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in
greenhouse gas concentrations accurately reflects the current
thinking of the scientific community on this issue ... Despite
the uncertainties, there is general agreement that the ob-

at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.ld.
28
Id. The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization
and the UN Environment Program. Id. It conducts rigorous surveys of the worldwide
technical and scientific literature and publishes assessment reports that are widely
recognized as the most credible existing sources of information on climate change. Id.
The IPCC also works on methodologies and responds to specific requests from the Convention's subsidiary bodies. Id.
29
S8894-02, supra note 5 (statement by Sen. McCain referencing an IPCC report).
ao S3936-01, supra note 8 (statement by Sen. Liebermann explaining that according
to the UN's IPCC Third Report on global warming authored by 700 scientists stated
that the earth's temperature can be expected to rise up to lOA degrees Fahrenheit in
the next 100 years). See also S8894-02, supra note 5 (statement by Sen. Lieberman).
31
S2300-02, supra note 4 (statement by Sen. Kerry paraphrasing Dr. Robert Watson, Chair of the IPCC).
32
S8894-02, supra note 5 (statement by Sen. Lieberman). See also National Academy of Science, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions (2001),
available at http://books.nap.edulbooksl03090757421htmi (visited Mar. 9, 2002) (referring to Appendix A - letter from the White House) !hereinafter Climate Change Science).
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served warming is real and particularly strong within the
past twenty years. 33

The most recent study conducted by NAS's National Research Council stated that global warming is "undoubtedly
real" and that over the past twenty years surface temperatures
have risen at a rate substantially greater than the past 100year average. 34 The NAS further advised the Bush Administration that current and future national policy decisions would
influence the extent of damage suffered by human populations
and ecosystems as the century progresses. 35
Around the same time that the FCCC authorized the creation of the IPCC, more than 2,000 United States scientists, including Nobel Laureates, signed the Scientists' Statement on
Global Disruption. 36 This statement collectively acknowledges
that GHG emissions will result in further global climate
change, the adverse impacts of which will include ecological,
economic, and social disruption. 37 Furthermore, the Amsterdam Declaration, another statement signed by a group of scientists regarding GHG emissions and global warming, was
drafted in response to the growing concern over anthropogenic
effects on the environment and ultimately on the human population. 38
In addition to collective statements by large groups of recognized scientists acknowledging global warming as real and
problematic, individual scientists have also come forward to
33
88894-02, supra note 5 (statement by 8en. Lieberman). See also Climate Change
Science, supra note 32 .
.. 82300-02, supra note 4 (statement by 8en. Kerry). See also Climate Change
Science, supra note 32.
.. 147 CONGo REC. 86078-01(daily ed. June 12, 2001) [hereinafter 86078-01) (statement by 8en. Kerry reading a crucial observation by the NAS).
.. 143 CONGo REC. 810920-01 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) [hereinafter 810920-01)
(statement by 8en. Wellstone).
37 [d.
38
See The Amsterdam Declaration, available at http://www.sciconf.igbp.kva.se/fr.
html (last modified Oct. 26,2001). The declaration states "the scientific communities of
four international global change research programs - the International GeosphereBiosphere Program (IGBP), the International Human Dimensions Program on Global
Environmental Change (IHDP), the World Climate Research Program (WCRP) and the
International Biodiversity Program DIVERSITAS - recognize that, in addition to the
threat of significant climate change, there is growing concern over the ever-increasing
human modification of other aspects of the global environment and the consequent
implications for human well-being." [d.
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publicly comment on global warming. At a recent Senate hearing on the impact of global climate change in the arctic environment, a number of national scientific leaders served as witnesses. 39 The majority of the witnesses attributed the recent
climate change to a number of factors, but the two key factors
cited by the witnesses were GHG emissions from anthropogenic
sources and natural climate system variations. 40 Dr. Thomas
Karl, climatology director of NOAA, testified before the Senate
regarding the scientific ability to distinguish between anthropogenic GHGs and naturally occurring GHGS.41 According to
Dr. Karl, C02 emissions have increased by twenty-five to thirty
percent since the beginning of the industrial revolution and he
attributes the increase almost entirely to human activity.42
Scientists are also beginning to release results of their own
studies on climate change further establishing the validity of
global warming. 43 For instance, scientists with the National
Center for Scientific Research in Grenoble, France, retrieved a
two-mile long ice core from the Antarctic Ice Sheet that showed
the levels of GHGs are higher than they have been for the past
420,000 years.44 Scientists at the University of Massachusetts
studied annual growth rings in trees, as well as chemical evidence contained in marine fossils, corals, and ancient ice, to
track the Earth's surface temperature over the past 600 years.
39
S6000-02, supra note 25 (statement by Sen. Stevens). Scientists who served as
witnesses for the hearing included Dan Goldin, the Head of the National Aeronautic
and Space Administration; Scott Gudes, the acting head of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration; Dr. Rita Colwell, National Science Foundation Director;
Charles Groat, U.S. Geological Survey Director; and experts from the International
Arctic Research Center and the University of Alaska's Geophysical Institute. Id.
Many of the Witnesses noted that recent climate change activity likely stems from a
number offactors, including natural variances and human activity. Id.
40
Id. (statement by Sen. Stevens speaking of an Appropriations Committee Field
Hearing in Fairbanks, Alaska on the impact of global climate change in the Arctic).
.. See generally Mike Ferullo, Climate Change: Senate Panel Considers Measure to
Create National Research Strategy, 32 ER 1404 (2001) .
•2
Id .
.. See Environmental Law Reporter, Climate Change, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NO. 21. "A
report prepared by Tom Wrigley, of the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and
Sarah Raper, of the University of East Anglia in the U.K., appearing in Science, concludes that average global temperatures will rise between four and seven degrees
Fahrenheit during this century, five times the elevation noticed during the last century." Id.
.. S2300-02, supra note 4 (statement by Sen. Kerry referencing a June 1999 article).
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Their research indicated that the Twentieth Century has been
the warmest century of the past six centuries. Specifically,
three years during the 1990s proved to be the warmest of the
600 years studied. 45 From the results of these studies, scientists have concluded that global warming appears to be closely
tied to anthropogenic GHG emissions rather than naturallyoccurring GHGS.46
Scientists from the University of Maryland and the National Aeronautic and Space Administration's Goddard Space
Flight Center each ran models on ice sheets in the Arctic to
assess their rate of melting. Currently, these ice sheets are
melting at a rate of 14,000 square miles per year. 47 The results
from both models found less than a two percent chance that the
melting is a result of normal climatic variations. Additionally,
the models indicated less than a tenth of a percent chance that
melting over the last 46 years was the result of normal variations.48

2. Scientific Opposition
Despite the widely held belief by most in the scientific
community that GHG emissions induce global warming and
cause adverse environmental effects, some reputable scientists
take the position that reliable scientific data fails to suggest
that GHG emissions facilitate global warming. 49 Not surprisingly, many of these same scientists have connections to industry and governmental interests opposed to more stringent environmental regulation. 50
Dr. Patrick Michaels, climatologist and professor of environmental science at the University of Virginia, believes most
of this century's global warming occurred in the fIrst half of the
century before there was a significant concentration of anthro.. Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry summarizing an Apr. 1998 article where 1990, 1995
and 1997 were found to be the warmest years in the last 600).
.. Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry summarizing an Apr. 1998 article).
" Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry summarizing a Dec. 1999 article).
.. Id. (statement by Sen. Kerry summarizing a Dec. 1999 article).
•• S2659-02, supra note 25 (statement by Rep. Peterson explaining that Dr. Sally
Baliunas of Harvard, Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, for example, agrees that
global warming science is in many cases exaggerated, flawed and unsettled).
'" See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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pogenic GHG emissions. 51 In keeping with Dr. Michaels, some
scientists estimate that nearly half of the climate warming
trends and changes that have occurred since 1850 are the result of natural variances such as the sun.52 Studies of the climate over the past 120 years by Harvard-Smithsonian Center
scientists indicate that the sun is responsible for up to 71 percent of the changes in earth's temperature. 53
Moreover, some scientists even believe the GHG C02 is not
worth monitoring, reducing or limiting. Dr. March, a researcher at the Argonne National Laboratory, stated that
Carbon dioxide is a minor greenhouse gas that contributes
only about three percent of the greenhouse effect, and manmade sources represent some three percent to four percent of
carbon dioxide emissions, the rest being from natural sources.
[l]f all the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere were to vanish
magically, it would lead to a one degree centigrade decrease
in global temperatures. 54

Some scientists think that reliable scientific data fails to
suggest that global warming will result in adverse environmental effects. For instance, Dr. Richard Lindzen, Professor of
Meteorology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology testified before the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee that research has failed to establish that global
warming is a significant problem. 55 Dr. Michaels testified that
conditions in the real world simply have not matched changes
projected by some global warming computer models. 56 Even
6' See generally 143 CONGo REc. S10308-01 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1997) [hereinafter
S10308-01) (statement by Sen. Hagel). See also supra note 24. Dr. Michaels edits the
World Climate Report, which receives funding from Western Fuels Association (coal
interest companies). [d.
62
[d. (statement by Sen. Hagel). One scientist, Judith Lean, stated "We figure that
half the climate change 'from 1850 to now can be accounted for by the Sun." [d. Ms.
Lean works for the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington. [d.
63
[d.
54
See generally 146 CONGo REC. S5291-01 (daily ed. June 16, 2000) [hereinafter
S5291-01) (statement by Sen. Hagel). Dr. March works for Argonne National Laboratory, a Department of Energy Laboratory operated by the University of Chicago. Argonne National Laboratory Home Page, at http://www.anl.gov (visited Mar. 16, 2002).
56
S10308-01, supra note 51 (statement by Sen. Hagel). See also supra note 24. Dr.
Lindzen is reported to have received $2,500 a day for his services as an in independent
scientist-consultant for the fossil fuel industry. [d.
56
[d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 9

704 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW tvol. 32:4
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") challenged a
recent report on climate change impacts on the United States. 57
Critical of the attempts by scientists to provide an accurate
prediction of climate change in the United States over the coming 100 years, the EPA contends that:
Virtually all published estimates of how climate could change
in the United States are the result of computer models ...
These complicated models ... are still not accurate enough to
provide reliable forecasts on how the climate may change; and
the several models often yield contradictory results ... Scientists are unable to say whether particular regions will receive
more or less rainfall; and for many regions they are unable to
even state whether a wetter or drier climate is more likely.58

In the eyes of some reputable, but industrially and politically affiliated American scientists, the debate as to the causes
and impacts of global warming is far from settled. The publication of new studies and opinions supporting both positions continue. Despite the divergent opinions concerning global warming, much of the international community has chosen to take a
proactive approach. Convinced by the overwhelming scientific
support suggesting that global warming will inevitably lead to
globally adverse environmental impacts, the international
community chose to initiate a global solution to a global problem. The global solution was the creation of the Kyoto Protocol
to reduce and limit global GHG emissions.
III. DISCUSSION

A.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING: KyOTO
PROTOCOL

On December 10, 1997, over 180 parties to the United Nations FCCC met in Kyoto, Japan for the third Conference of the
Parties (COP-3).59 During COP-3, the parties established the
., S5291-01, supra note 54 (statement by Sen. Hagel).
.. Id. The Whitman Administration made this comment. Id. President George W.
Bush appointed Christine Whitman Administrator of the EPA. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Office of the Administrator, available at http://www.epa.gov/
adminweb/about.htm (last updated Apr. 3, 2002).
.. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Guide to Climate
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international amendment to the FCCC known as the Kyoto
Protocol. 60 As of June 4, 2002, 84 parties have signed the
Kyoto Protocol. 61 Forty-two parties have ratified the Kyoto
Protocol while an additional 32 parties have either acceded to,
approved or accepted the Kyoto Protocol. 62
The Kyoto Protocol, a continually evolving piece of internationallaw, establishes and refines international guidelines for
the reduction and limitation of GHG emissions. The primary
focus of the Kyoto Protocol is stabilization of atmospheric GHG
concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the global climate. 63 The GHGs regulated under the Kyoto Protocol originate from industrial
sources, such as fuel combustion, energy, transportation,
manufacturing, construction, mining, chemical, agriculture,
and waste management. The regulated GHGs include carbon
dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur
hexafluoride (SF6).
The Kyoto Protocol provides four primary mechanisms to
address GHG emission reduction and limitation. Currently,
the mechanisms focus on Annex 1 parties, specifically those
industrialized countries that have historically contributed to

Change Negotiation Process: IPCC, available at http://www.unfccc.intJresource/process
IcomponentS/institution lipcc.html (last modified Nov. 08, 2001). The FCCC text was
adopted at the UN Headquarters in NY in May of 1992. Id. The FCCC was initiated
in March 1994. Id. See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Glossary, available at http://www.unfccc.de/siteinfo Iglossary.html (last modified June 21, 2001) [hereinafter Glossary]. The COP is the supreme body of the Convention. It currently meets once a year to review the Convention's progress. Id. The
word "conference" connotes an "association." Id.
00
Id. The glossary explains that a protocol is linked to an existing convention, but it
is a separate and additional agreement that must be signed and ratified by the Parties
to the convention. Id .
•, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
3d Sess., [1997] U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1I1997 reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 32
(1998) [hereinafter Kyoto). See also Glossary, supra note 59 (explaining that parties to
the Kyoto Protocol are not limited strictly to countries). When a regional economic
integration organization becomes a party without the states of the organization being
parties, the organization is still bound to the obligations of the protocol. Id. Where the
states of the organization are also parties to the Protocol, then the states and the organization will decide the responsibilities of each to meet the obligations of the Protocol. Id. See also Section VII: Appendix.
62
Id.
63
Kyoto, supra note 61.
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GHG emissions. 64 Annex 1 parties also include those countries
with economies in transit, whereas non-Annex 1 parties are
comprised primarily of developing countries.
While the four mechanisms suggest GHG reduction and
limitation methods for non-Annex 1 parties, enumerated reduction commitments have not been established for non-Annex 1
parties. Annex 1 parties, however, must comply with enumerated reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protoco1. 65 Annex 1 parties are responsible for ensuring their respective aggregate anthropogenic C02 equivalent GHG emissions do not
exceed a calculated limit. 66 GHG emissions must be reduced,
overall, by five percent below 1990 levels between the years of
2008 and 2012.67 The calculated limitations of the GHGs were
determined by taking into account the individual and aggregate Annex 1 party GHG emissions of 1990. 68
Annex 1 parties may utilize the four mechanisms to
achieve compliance with Kyoto's enumerated requirements.
First, joint fulfillment allows an Annex 1 party to offset its
enumerated GHG emissions reduction and limitation obligations by working with a non-Annex 1 party.69 Second, emission
reduction units (ERUs) allow parties to transfer and acquire
emission reduction units from each other.70 Parties who transfer ERUs lose their ability to emit GHGs for the quantity of
units transferred. Parties acquiring ERUs may emit GHGs up

.. Glossary, supra note 59. Annex 1 parties include industrialized countries who
have historically contributed to global climate change as well as countries with
"economies in transition" (known as EITs). [d. Annex I parties consist of the 24 original Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD) members, the European Union,
and 14 countries with economies in transition. [d. The OECD consists of Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the US. [d.
55
Kyoto, supra note 6l.
.. [d.
67
[d.

•

.. [d.
69
[d.
7. [d.
Achieving the required emissions limitations and reduction commitments
included ensuring that the calculated emission limits are not exceeded, that the emissions are reduced to a level 5 percent below that of the base year between the years of
2008 and 2012 and that post 2012 emission limitations and reductions are met. [d.
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to the quantity of units they have purchased from the transferring party.
The third mechanism, separately identified yet related to
ERUs, is emission trading.71 If a party wishes to use emission
. trading to achieve its enumerated reduction commitment, the
trading must be in addition to domestic efforts already underway to achieve compliance with enumerated commitments. 72
The clean development mechanism (CDM) is the fourth
mechanism by which non-Annex 1 and Annex 1 parties can
achieve the quantified emission limitations and reductions. 73
Under the CDM, non-Annex 1 parties benefit from approved
ERU programs by reducing their own GHG emissions before
mandatory reductions have been announced. 74 In addition, the
CDM helps non-Annex 1 parties achieve sustainable development while assisting with the FCCC's ultimate goal: reducing
GHGS.75 An Annex 1 party that creates CDM programs resulting in actual reductions may use those reductions to meet its
quantified emission reduction and limitation commitments under Article III of the Protocol. 76
In addition to the aforementioned mechanisms to achieve
the quantified emission reductions and limitations, Annex 1
parties may also rely on sinks. 77 A sink is place where carbon
accumulates without increasing the levels of existing C02 in
the atmosphere. 78 For Annex 1 parties to meet their reduction
71
[d. Article XVII addresses the principles, modes, rules and guidelines for emission trading. The aspect of emission trading that is of concern is reporting and accountability. [d. According to Article XVII, parties at a COP should define the emission trading reporting and accountability principles, modes, rules and guidelines. [d.
72 [d.
73
[d. The clean development mechanism can also be used to arrange funding for
certified emission reduction unit project activities. [d. Part of the funding for various
projects will be used for administrative expenses. [d.
7.
[d.
7. [d. In order for the emission reductions to be used towards reaching compliance
with the quantified emission reduction and limitation commitments, the reductions
must occur no earlier than January 1, 2000. [d. The reductions accrued will go towards compliance during the 2008 through 2012 compliance commitment period. [d.
7. [d. Certification is based on the voluntary participation of the parties, the real,
measurable, long-term benefits from the reduction and the reductions are a result of
more than what would occur if the reduction program did not exist. [d.
77
[d. While the overall reduction of GHG emissions is not expected until at least
2008, Annex 1 parties are expected to make demonstrable progress towards achieving
the overall reduction goal by the year 2005. [d.
7. See Exploring the Environment: Global Climate Change - Glossary, available at
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commitments, they may use sinks resulting from post-1990
human induced land use change, afforestation, deforestation,
and reforestation activities. 79
The Kyoto Protocol will enter into force after two separate,
but connected, conditions occur. First, at least 55 parties to the
FCCC must sign and ratify or accede to, accept or approve of
the Kyoto ProtocoPO Those 55 or more parties must account
for no less than 55 percent of the total reported 1990 carbon
dioxide emissions. 81 Once both conditions have been satisfied,
the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force 90 days later.82 Mter
the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, any additional parties interested in joining must do so by becoming a party and acceding to, accepting or approving of the Kyoto Protocol. Upon the
party's accession, acceptance or approval, the Kyoto Protocol
will not go into effect for that party for 90 days.83
For nearly five years, the United States was an active participant in the development of the Kyoto Protocol. The Clinton
Administration was determined to establish the United States
as a conscientious player in global environmental policy.84 Although the United States was an original signatory to the
Kyoto Protocol under the Clinton administration, Congress has
taken considerable steps in the last four years to ensure that
the United States does not ratify the Kyoto Protocol as written. 85

http://www.cotf.edulete/modules/climate/GCglossary.html (last modified Feb. 13,2001).
79
Kyoto, supra note 61.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
S<
United States Department of State - International Information Programs, Fact
Sheet: President Clinton and Vice President Gore Environmental Leadership on the 30th
Anniversary of Earth Day, available at http://usinfo.stategov/topicallgloballenviron
/latest00042204.htm (visited Mar. 16, 2002).
so See S. Res. 98, 105th Congo (1997) (enacted) [hereinafter S. Res. 98]. See also
Pamela Najor, Climate Change: GOP Lawmaker Sees Need to Revamp Kyoto Pact to
Remove Reduction Mandates, 236 DEN a-5, 2000 [hereinafter Reduction Mandates].
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B. UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE KyOTO PROTOCOL:
"FATALLY FLAWED"
Criticism of the Kyoto Protocol stems from two primary
concerns: (1) the lack of binding reduction and limitation commitments on developing countries during the first compliance
period and (2) the perceived potential for adverse economic impact on Kyoto-compliant industrialized countries. 86 Fearing
that the Clinton Administration would ratify of the Kyoto Protocol without binding participation on the part of developing
nations, Congress passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution in 1997,
which stated the:
United States should not be a signatory to any protocol . . .
which would mandate new commitments to limit or reduce
GHGs for the Annex 1 parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce GHGs for developing country parties
within the same compliance period or which would result in
serious harm to the economy of the United States. 87

The Byrd-Hagel resolution passed unanimously (95-0),
demonstrating broad bipartisan agreement that the United
States should not implement the Kyoto Protocol as written. 88
Congressional concern over the adverse impacts on the United
States' economy and disparity of treatment between developing
and industrialized countries has not waned over the last four
years.
To further secure its position, in 1998, Congress mandated
that no 1999 EPA-appropriated funding be used to "propose or
issue rules, regulations, decrees or orders for the purpose of
implementation or in preparation for implementation of the
86
Bush Position, supra note 1. "The report summarizes the initial positions of the
Bush Administration on climate change after three months of an ongoing Cabinet-level
review. It includes an overview of the current US actions to address climate change, an
analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, a discussion about advancing the science of climate
change and the technology to address it, and a plan for promoting cooperation in the
Western Hemisphere and the world." [d. Cf Philip Gwage, Equity and Global Climate Change: An LDC Perspective, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/eventsl
conCpresentationslgwage.doc (visited Mar. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Equity) (explaining
the principle of equity as it relates to Kyoto compliance requirements).
87
S. Res. 98, supra note 85.
86
[d.
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Kyoto Protocol."89 The 2000 and 2001 EPA budgets contained
the same limitation. 90 Due to the specificity of its restrictions
on the EPA's use of funding, Congress has effectively precluded
the EPA's ability to establish any meaningful guidelines to address global warming if those guidelines remotely resemble
those of the Kyoto Protocol. 91
The shift from the Clinton administration to the Bush Administration has strengthened the United States' vocal opposition to the Kyoto Protocol. 92 According to President Bush, the
"Kyoto Protocol is fatally flawed in fundamental ways."93 Despite the onerous negotiating process involved in establishing
the Kyoto Protocol, President Bush stated that the targets and
timetables for the long-term goals "were arrived at arbitrarily
and were not related to any specific scientific information or
long-term objective."94 Accordingly, President Bush's view on
the Kyoto Protocol is in keeping with that of other members of
his Administration.
A recent report issued by the Bush Administration cabinet,
at the request of President Bush, stated that the Kyoto Protocol
fails to establish long-term goals based on science, poses serious and unnecessary risks to the United States and world
economies, and is ineffective in addressing climate change because it excludes major parts of the world. 95 EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman stated "The Kyoto Protocol is unfair to the United States and to other industrialized nations
because it exempts 80 percent of the world from compliance."96
In addition to its fear that the Kyoto Protocol is unfair and
lacking in scientific support, the Bush Administration has declared that the costs implicated in complying with the Kyoto
Protocol's GHG emission reduction and limitation commitments could be quite substantial. 97 The Bush Administration
.. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 769, 105th Congo (1998).
00
Reduction Mandates, supra note 85.
9. See, e.g., Michael J. O'Grady, Going Nowhere Fast: The Environmental Record of
the l05th Congress, 29 ENVfL. L. REP. 10085 (1999).
.. Bush Position, supra note 1.
93
[d.
.. [d.
IN! [d.
96 [d. Cf Equity, supra note 86.
97
Bush Position, supra note 1.
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has compared compliance with the Kyoto Protocol with that of
the impacts of the 1970's oil crisis: potential transformation of
the United States economy from "one of strong growth to recession, with potentially significant repercussions for the global
economy."98
Supporters of President Bush's stance on the Kyoto Protocol have applauded his "go-slow" approach and have further
commended him for asserting that the Kyoto Protocol is "fatally
flawed."99 However, even those in agreement with the President's decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol are supportive of
some type of domestic program to address global climate
change issues. As Senator Lieberman pointed out during a
July 17, 2001 press statement: "Despite President Bush's unwillingness to be a leader, there is growing support from both
parties who want America to be a part of the world community
in addressing the crisis of climate."lOO
Agreeing that the United States should not ignore increasing domestic GHG emissions, other senators also advocate the
United States' involvement in a program to reduce and limit
GHG emissions. For instance, Senator Jeffords, the head of the
Senate Environment Committee, is urging the Bush Administration to reduce global warming linked to C02 emissions in
the wake of the Administration's refusal to ratify the Kyoto
ProtocoPOl Jeffords has proposed new legislation that would
require GHG emission reductions from power plants. 102 Senator McCain and Senator Kerry proposed legislation that would
speed technology investments for the curtailment of GHG
emissions. 103 Senator Stevens has proposed legislation to inId.
See, e.g., Jon E. Hilsenrath, Environmental Assessment Favor Slow Approach,
THE ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2001, at M8.
.
100
Planet Ark News Search Results - World Environment News UPDATE: Lieberman Says Bush Made US Climate "Renegade" by Patrick Connole (July 18, 2001),
available at http://www.planetark.org/avantgol!lailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=11620 (visited Jan. 2, 2002).
101
Planet Ark News Search Results - World Environment News: Ex-Republican
Senator Aims at Power Plant Emissions (July 17, 2001), available at http://www.planet
ark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=11634 (visited Jan. 2, 2002).
lIrl
Id.
103
Planet Ark News Search Results - World Environment News: Senator McCain
Urges Bush to Act Now on Climate Change by Patrick Connole (July 11, 2001), available at http//:www.planetark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=11507 (visited
Jan. 2, 2002).
98

99
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crease GHG emission reduction and limitation research and
development.104 Even Senator Byrd, the coauthor of the ByrdHagel resolution, gives credence to the proposition that the
United States should curb its GHG emissions.105 Senator Byrd
is co-sponsoring a climate bill to provide almost five billion dollars for research and development toward GHG emission reduction and limitation. lo6
While the current administration refuses to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol as written, it is not the only mechanism by
which to reduce and limit domestic GHG emissions. In many
ways, the United States has been a pioneer in the field of environmental regulation. Therefore, current environmental regulatory programs may be used to regulate GHG emissions or
may be used to provide guidance in developing a new and more
appropriate mechanism to address GHG emission limitations
and reductions.

C.

UNITED STATES DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO GWBAL WARMING

In proposing a domestic response to combat global warming, the Kyoto Protocol is helpful in determining which GHG
emissions require reguiation within the United States. All six
of the anthropogenic C02 equivalent GHGs identified in the
Kyoto Protocol are present in the United States and, therefore,
require regulation. If the United States plans to regulate GHG
emissions though an existing regulatory mechanism, it could
potentially rely on one program found within the EPA's Clean
Air Act (CAA).107 Additionally, two environmental regulatory
schemes that rely on market-based incentives, EPA's Title IV
Acid Rain Program and California's RECLAIM Program, can
serve as a template for the creation of the new GHG regulatory
scheme. This section outlines those programs.

104
Planet Ark News Search Results - World Environment News UPDATE: Senate
Panel Weighs New Climate Change Bill by Patrick Connole (July 19, 2001), available at
http://www.planetark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=1l645 (visited Jan. 2,
2002).
"lO [d.
106 [d.
107
Clean Air Act, Title I, §101, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1990) The EPA's authority
to regulate the emissions of various constituents originates from the Clean Air Act.
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It is important to keep in mind, however, the current ban
on EPA-appropriated funding for programs that resemble the
Kyoto Protoco1. 108 In order for the EPA to implement a program aimed at reducing and limiting GHG emissions, as outlined in the Kyoto Protocol, Congress will have to lift the funding ban. Nonetheless, by its very nature, a domestic program
would not encompass the provisions in the Kyoto Protocol that
Congress found problematic in 1997 when it adopted the ByrdHagel Resolution. In addition, many of the same Senators that
objected to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol now support
instituting a program to address global warming. 109 Therefore,
the growing political support for domestic GHG regulation will
help facilitate the creation and implementation of a domestic
GHG emission reduction and limitation program.

1. Current Federal Program: National Ambient Air Quality
Standards
As of 2002, at least one program outlined under the CAA
may potentially serve as a successful regulatory scheme for
addressing domestic GHG emission reductions and limitations.
This program is the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) under §108 and §109 of the CAA.l1O NAAQS establishes outdoor air quality standards. 111
Section 108 of the CAA, Air Quality Criteria and Control
Techniques, is the air pollutant identification portion of
NAAQS. Section 302 of the Act dermes an air pollutant as any
air pollutant agent or combination of agents emitted into or
that otherwise enter the ambient air.112 Under §108, the EPA
is authorized to revise the list of air pollutants established under NAAQS and may add newly identified air pollutants.1 13
Newly identified air pollutants have two levels of control: primary standards for promoting the protection of public health

See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
110
Clean Air Act, Title I, §§108-109, 42 U.S.C. §§7408-7409 (1990).
111
EPA Terms of the Environment (last modified July 6, 1998) available at:
http://www.epa.gov/studentslterms_oCenvironment.htm.
112
Clean Air Act, Title I, §302, 42 U.S.C. §7602 (1990).
113
Clean Air Act, Title I, §108, 42 U.S.C. §7408 (1990).
1'"
109
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and secondary standards for promoting the protection of public
welfare. 114
Any constituent that the EPA adds to the list of air pollutants for control under NAAQS through §108 and §109 is analyzed using two factors.115 First, the EPA must make a judgment as to whether the constituent has the potential to reasonably endanger the public health or welfare. 116 Second, the
EPA must consider the constituent's numerous and diverse
mobile and stationary sources.ll7
Since GHGs are agents emitted into the ambient air,
GHGs are likely to fit the definition of an air pollutant under
§302 of the CAA.118 As such, each of the six GHGs may be included as an air pollutant under NAAQS, assuming it meets
the aforementioned factors mandated for the addition of a constituent as a new pollutant. For instance, under an EPA review of CH4, the EPA would assess the potential for CH4 to
reasonably endanger the public health or welfare. The EPA
would also need to consider the numerous and diverse mobile
and stationary sources of CH4 before identifying it as an air
pollutant for regulation under NAAQS.
The pivotal inquiry in assessing whether a constituent can
be regulated under NAAQS hinges on the constituent's potential to reasonably endanger public health or welfare. How to
make that assessment, however, is not readily clear from the
statutory language. Holding that the determination as to
whether a constituent "reasonably endangers" the public
should be made by the regulating agency, the District of Columbia Circuit Court explained that:

114

Clean Air Act, Title I, §109, 42 U.S.C. §7409 (1990).

11. See supra note 113. See also supra note 114.

See supra note 113.
Id. See also supra note 112. "Effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to,
effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man-made materials, animals, wildlife,
weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards
to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and
well-being, whether caused by transformation, conversion, or combination with other
air pollutants." Id.
116
Ambient air is defmed by a two-prong test: whether the location of the air is
external to buildings and whether the air is accessible to the general public. Clarification Letter from EPA for Ambient Air Definition, available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/
nsr/gen/memo-x.html (visited Mar. 16, 2002).
116

117
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Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to
protect the public health, and the decision that of an expert
administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof
of cause and effect. The Administrator may apply his expertise to draw conclusions from suspected, but not completely
substantiated, relationships between facts, from trends
among facts, from theoretical projections from imperfect data,
from probative preliminary data not yet certifiable as "fact,"
and the like.1l9

American Trucking Ass'n. Inc. u. U.S.E.P.A followed this
reasoning. 120 The court held that EPA's decision to adopt and
set air quality standards need only be based on "reasonable
extrapolations from some reliable evidence."121 In so holding,
the court noted that §108(a)(1)(A) of the CAA requires no proof
of causation; the Administrator may deem emissions "air pollutants" when they "in his judgment, cause or contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare."122 Therefore, courts will uphold the
EPA's decision to add a new constituent for NAAQS regulation
so long as its addition relies on reasonable extrapolations from
some reliable evidence.
2. Current Federal and State Programs: A Template for Regulating GHG Emissions
While NAAQS has the potential to regulate GHGs as air
pollutants, other approaches may be more appropriate. For
example, the EPA initially relied on NAAQS to regulate nitrous
oxides (NOx) and sulfur oxides (SOx) emissions from Midwest
power plants, the major culprits contributing to acid rain in the
Northeast. NAAQS, however, soon proved to be unsuccessful
in adequately regulating the power industry's NOx and SOx
119
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 432, 256 U.S. App. D.C. 310,
332 (D.C. Cir. 1986) citing Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir.) (footnotes
omitted), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941, 96 S. Ct. 2662, 49 L.Ed.2d 394 (1976).
00
175 F.3d 1027, 1055 U.S. App. D.C. 16,45 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
121 [d. Citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 432, 256 U.S. App.
D.C. 310, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
122 [d.
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emissions. 123 As a result, Congress promulgated a new program under the CAA that authorized EPA to implement and
enforce a more aggressive approach to NOx and SOx emission
reduction and limitation. 124 This program, known as the Acid
Rain Program, under Title IV of the CAA, is a regulatory
scheme relying on market-based incentives.
With respect to GHGs, the United States should also review current environmental regulatory programs in order to
develop a new program that most effectively addresses global
warming. In light of the industry-backed political forces that
tend to favor scant environmental regulation, a market-based
incentives program may well· be easier to pass through Congress than a control and command approach to reducing GHGs.
Two programs merit review as potential templates for developing a new GHG regulatory scheme: EPA's CAA Title IV
program and California's South Coast Air Quality Management
District's (SCAQMD) Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
(RECLAIM) program. As discussed above, the Acid Rain Program is a market-based incentives regulatory approach to controlling power plant NOx and SOx emissions. 125 Likewise,
RECLAIM was developed to address NOx and SOx emissions
in the Los Angeles air basin. 126 A new regulatory program to
most effectively address domestic GHGs contributing to global
warming will, in part, be based on analyses of current programs' weaknesses and strengths.
a. EPA's Acid Rain Program: Title IV of the CAA
The Acid Rain program under Title IV of the CAA, promulgated in 1990, regulates power generation NOx and SOx emissions through a market-based incentives approach.127 Imple123
Byron Swift, How Environmental Law Works: An analysis of the Utility Sector's
Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide under The Clean Air Act,
14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 314 (2001).
,.. Clean Air Act, Title IV, §401, 42 U.S.C. §7651 (2001).
125
THE PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT, U.S. EPA, Pub. No. EPA-400K-93-001 (1993) !hereinafter Plain English Guide].
126 See generally South Coast Air Quality Management District Website, at
http://www.aqmd.gov (last modified Dec. 27, 2001). See also South Coast Air Quality
Management District RECLAIM Rules, available at http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/html/
tofc20.html (last modified May 30, 2001).
127 Supra note 124.
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mentation of Title IV occurs through an integrated set of rules
and guidelines established to meet three objectives. l28 The fIrst
objective is achieving environmental benefits through SOx and
NOx emission reductions. l29 The second objective is energy
efficient pollution prevention and facilitating active trading of
allowances. l3o The last objective is the use of other compliance
options to minimize compliance costs, maximize economic efficiency, and permit strong economic growth.l31
Title IV focuses on two divergent regulatory schemes to reduce NOx and SOx emissions from utility sources: (1) a ratebased standard for NOx and (2) a cap-and-trade approach for
SOX. l32 With regard to the SOx cap-and-trade approach, the
EPA determined the baseline allowance allocations for the
utilities according to their average emissions between 1985 and
1987,133 Allowances are issued annually and entitle the holder
to emit a certain number of tons of SOx. Each year, the emission source retires from its bank of emission allowances the
number of tons of SOx emitted during that year. l34 Each successive year, allowances are issued in smaller quantities to
emission sources, according to a fixed statutory schedule, to
ensure Title IV's targeted SOx reductions of 50 percent. l35
When an emission source exceeds its annual allowance, it receives a $2,000 fine for each exceeded ton of emissions and is
forced to offset the violation the following year,136

128

129
130

131

Plain English Guide, supra note 125.
[d.
[d.
[d.

m See generally Byron Swift, Command and Control: Why Cap and Trade Should
Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10330 (2001). See
also Clean Air Act, Title IV, §403, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (2001). See also Clean Air Act,
Title IV, §407, 42 U.S.C. § 7651£(2001).
... Clean Air Act, Title IV, §404, 42 U.S.C. §7651c (2001). The EPA may authorize,
under certain circumstances, adjustments to the baseline allowance allocations. Id.
"" Richard B. Stewart, James L. Connaughton & Lesley C. Foxhall, Designing an
International Greenhouse Gas Emissions trading System, 15 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 160,
161 (Winter, 2001).
134 See supra note 133.
136 Clean Air Act, Title IV, §412, 42 U.S.C. §7651k (2001).
An offset is where a
source must reduce current emissions to make room for new emissions. Id. An Example would be a facility that wants to emit an additional ten tons, it would be required to
reduce its existing emissions by twenty tons making a overall reduction of ten tons of
emissions.
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To facilitate the SOx cap-and-trade program, two phases of
the cap-and-trade regulatory scheme were established. The
Phase I required the 263 dirtiest coal-fired generating units to
reduce SOx emissions to 5.7 million tons.137 Phase II, implemented in 2000, includes the 263 Phase I coal-fIred generating
units and all other generating units larger than twenty-fIve
megawatts. 13S The overall SOx emission cap for Phase II is
8.95 million tons. 139
The trading aspect of Title IV is handled by the Chicago
Board of Trade Futures Market; the tracking of the allowance
trading is handled by the Continuous Emissions Monitoring
System. 140 The EPA records permit purchases through an Allowance Tracking System. 14l The purchases of emission allowances from other emission sources are made by private transactions through annual EPA sponsored auctions,142 As of June
1997, nearly 2,700 trades had occurred involving 42.4 million
allowances. 143
Title IV does not dictate the means by which a particular
emission source is to satisfy its emissions requirements. 144 The
emission source may rely on any of a number of strategies,
such as innovating new technology, switching to low-sulfur
coal, or shutting down a production unit. 145 For example, some
emission sources are developing new technologies to improve
effIciency. Regulated sources have generated scrubber innovations and initiated research on fuel blending. 146 Within a year
of the program's 1995 commencement, emissions were almost
40 percent below the reduction schedule target. 147 Contemporaneously, total domestic electricity generation actually increased by over two and a half percent. 14S Control costs for the

'38

See supra note 133.
Clean Air Act, Title lV, §405, 42 U.S.C. §765ld (2001).

139

[d.

140

See supra note 134.

'37

'<I See supra note 136.
142

[d.

'43 See supra note 134.

'44 See supra note 124.
'" Clean Air Act, Title lV, §408, 42 U.S.C. §7651g (2001).
Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Note, Warming up to an International Greenhouse Gas
Market: Lessons from the US Acid Rain Program, 20 STAN. ENVfL. L.J. 221, 238 (2001).
147
Plain English Guide, supra note 125.
148
See supra note 146.
146

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/9

26

DiLuigi: Domestic Greenhouse Gas Regulation

2002] DOMESTIC GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION

719

Title IV regulatory scheme were nearly 50 percent less than
those of the command and control regulatory alternative.1 49
The pollution reductions accomplished under Title IV account
for over 50 percent of the total pollution reductions of the last
ten years. 150 Remarkably, the Title IV program is administered
by an EPA staff ofless than 100 nationwide.1 51
b. The South Coast Air Quality District's Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market Program
In keeping with EPA's Title IV Acid Rain program, California adopted a market-based incentives program to control
NOx and SOx emissions. In 1991, SCAQMD introduced a
marketable permit system to help regulate the 12,000 square
mile Los Angeles air basin. 152 SCAQMD created and implemented RECLAIM in 1993 to specifically address increasing
NOx and SOx emissions. 153 RECLAIM is based on the tradable
permit approach.1 54 RECLAIM, however, differs from the traditional cap-and-trade program in that regulated sources have
differing "caps" for emitting the same pollutants.
Under RECLAIM, there is no explicit cap on emissions;
rather there are overall mandated emissions reductions. 155
These emissions reductions vary depending on the emission
source and are measured against a baseline emissions level.
Emission rights allocated to the regulated emission sources
were based on the existing emissions at the time RECLAIM
was adopted. RECLAIM further established phased reductions
of emission allowances for the period of 1994 to 2003. 156 The
regulated emission sources receive declining emission allocations as the years progress towards 2003. 157 Currently. over

14. See supra note 134.

..., [d.
See supra note 146.
162
See South Coast Air Quality Management District Rules 2000-2015 (1993), available at http://www.aqmd.gov/ruleslhtml/tofc20.html.(last modified May 30, 2001).
163
[d.
"" See supra note 126.
1M See supra note 154.
1M [d.
m See supra note 152.
I'I
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500 industries are regulated by RECLAIM in an area that has
fourteen million residents. 158
D. MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES: THEORY

Since GHGs will arguably be most effectively regulated
under a market-based incentives program, it is important to
address the theories behind this approach to environmental
regulation. As one industrialist put it "all pollution and all
waste is lost profit."159 In other words, the more efficient the
production process is, the fewer emissions result. 160 As a
means to integrating efficient production with environmental
regulation, experts began supporting a market-based incentives approach to environmental regulation. 161 By the 1970's
regulators began looking at various market-based incentives
approaches for establishing environmental regulations, though
they were still not as popular or accepted as the traditional
command and control approaches.l 62
In 1988, market-based incentives finally received significant attention, specifically with regard to air pollution and
emission reductions and limitations. Although there is still
disagreement as to the effectiveness of this approach, academia, government, private industry, and the environmental
community began to explore market-based incentives as an
'08 CorpWatch, Trading Places: Lethal Lessons from LA, (1998), available at
www.igc.orgltraclfeature/climate/pollutionlbox.html (visited Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter
Lethal Lessons].
'08
Global Futures Foundation: Market-Based Environmental Laws: 100 Ways to Use
Prices to Prevent Pollution (1997), available at http:www.globalff.orglfeature_articlesl
previous_articles/pre-10Ow.htm (last modified Apr. 11, 1999) [hereinafter 100 WaysJ.
This article quoted William K. Coors speaking on market-based environmental policy.
'00 Id.
'6' John A. Barrett, Jr., The Global Environment and Free Trade: A Vexing Problem
and a Taxing Solution, 76 INn. L.J. 829, 840 (2001).
'62 World Resources Institute: Economic instruments for pollution control and prevention .. A brief overview by Duncan Austin, (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.wri.
orglwrilincentives /austin.html (last modified: Apr. 03, 2000). "In shaping the early
environmental policies of the 1970s, policy-makers instituted standard-based systems
in keeping with prevailing legal traditions of dealing with activities deemed excessive
by society (Spence and Weitzman, 1994). This "command and control" pattern of regulation set uniform targets for how much firms should emit, often by dictating the processes that should be used in their facilities. Two broad types of command and control
regulations are discernible: technology-based and performance-based (Stavins and
Whitehead,1992)." Id.
.
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alternative to the traditional command and control approach. 163
A report titled "Harnessing Market Forces to Protect Our Environment: Initiatives for the New President" by Robert Stavins
brought market-based incentives to the forefront of environmental regulation. 164 As a result, the market-based incentives
approach was adopted in the 1990 CAA amendments as Title
IV and eventually made its way into state regulatory programs,
such as RECLAIM.
From a policy standpoint, market-based incentives assign
legal and financial responsibility to the party most responsible
for creating the emissions. As a result, the more emissions
created by the party, the more the party must pay. Conversely,
if a party reduces its emissions, its costs are likewise reduced.
This approach is thought to stimulate the free market by allowing the parties responsible for the emissions to determine how
to best utilize their monetary and natural resources. 165 According to Harvard University's Environment and Natural Resources Program, market-based incentives can be "cost effective, minimizing the aggregate cost of achieving an environmental target and can provide dynamic incentives for the adoption and diffusion of better technologies."166
Through market-based incentives, the cost of misusing
and/or overusing a resource, such as ambient air, is externalized. Therefore, there is a major financial incentive for reducing resource misuse and/or overuse.1 67 Usually, installing in-

'63 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243,1245
(1968). A theory has emerged to explain why market-based incentives are superior to
command and control regulation. This theory is premised, in part, on the 1968 article
by biologist Garrett Hardin: The Tragedy of the Commons. Air, water, land and all
other resources available for common use are typically free. By assigning economic
value to a natural resource, efficiency would result because industry would regard
consider it in their costs. By increasing natural resource efficiency, the outcome predicated in Tragedy of the Commons is avoided. Id .
• 64
Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government - Environmental &
Natural Resources Program: Market-Based Environmental Policy, available at http://ks
gnotes1.harvard.edulBCSlAIENRP.nsf7weblMktEnvIPol (last modified July 17, 2001).
... 100 Ways, supra note 159.
.... See supra note 164.
• 67
Jonathon R. Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradeable Allowances
and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 479 (2000). See also
Richard B. Stewart, James L. Connaughton & Lesley C. Foxhall, Designing an International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, 15 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 160, 161
(Winter, 2001).
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novative technology to reduce or limit emissions is preferable to
polluting when the cost of installing technology is less then
buying the right to emit from another party.168 Ideally, innovation spurs new technologies, which in turn results in emission
reductions.
In order to facilitate innovative technologies, enforcement
of uniform standards must be equally borne by all parties under the regulation. 169 A strict uniform maximum emissions
level, coupled with the ability to trade, ensures continuous innovation. For example, a source's ability to sell excess emissions rights to a party that needs them to comply with the environmental regulatory cap creates an incentive to develop
cleaner technology.1 70 Further, the option to trade emission
rights reduces the risks associated with innovation if the new
technology fails.1 71 As a result, the emerging successful technologies and a decreasing overall cap reduce emissions and
create a more efficient and productive process so that both the
parties and the environment benefit.172
Under a market-based incentives approach, a buyer may
purchase additional emission rights from parties who have not
used their allocated rights. Once the buyer purchases the right
to emit from a seller, the seller no longer has the right to emit
the quantity of emissions sold. Theoretically, this system of
trading creates a pollution control system that is the most cost
effectiveY3 When a party emits more emissions than authorized, the party has two options: (1) purchase additional rights
to emit; or (2) suffer a non-compliance fine. The fine for exceeding the emissions limit tends to be more costly than trading or
process modification. 174
The compliance system for a market-based incentives program is imperative for the regulatory scheme is to be successful. Ideally, the compliance scheme will encompass a continuous monitoring system based on: (1) the regulated sources' reSee supra note 161.
See supra note 164.
170
[d.
171 Id.
172 [d.
173
[d.
174
Id. The automation of the fmes for non-compliance is directly related to the system for monitoring emission sales and purchases by the various buyers and sellers.
168
169
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ported emissions and (2) the trading traffic reported by the
overseeing entity.
IV. CRITIQUE
Having introduced some current programs and approaches
by which a domestic GHG regulatory program might be guided,
it is important to analyze whether these programs are suitable
for the regulation of GHGs. This section explores each program's weaknesses and strengths with respect to potential
GHG regulation.

A. NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS:
INCORPORATING GHGs FOR REGULATION
The EPA has identified six constituents for primary and
secondary NAAQS regulation.1 75 Those constituents currently
regulated under NAAQS include ozone (03), carbon monoxide
(CO), sulfur dioxide (S02), nitrogen dioxide (N02) , particulate
matter (PMlO), and lead (Pb).176 Because none of the GHGs are
currently identified under NAAQS, the two factors for adding a
new air pollutant must be considered: (1) the GHG's ability to
reasonably endanger public health or welfare, and (2) the quantity and mobility of the GHG's sources.1 77
Looking at the fIrst factor, to determine a GHG's ability to
reasonably endanger public health or welfare, reliable scientifIc
data is necessary. As previously mentioned, scientific research
1711
See EPA Green Book: Welcome to the Green Book: Nonattainment Areas for Crite·
ria Pollutants (Aug. 16,2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbklindex
.html (visited Jan. 2, 2002) !hereinafter Green Book].
17.
[d. "Ozone (0.), a photochemical oxidant, is a major smog component. While O.
in the upper atmosphere is beneficial to life by shielding the earth from harmful ultraviolet radiation, high ground level concentrations are a major health and environmental concern. Carbon monoxide (CO) is a colorless, odorless and poisonous gas produced by incomplete fuel burning. Nitrogen dioxide (NO,) is a brownish, highly reactive gas found in all urban atmospheres. NO, irritates the lungs, causes bronchitis and
pneumonia, and lowers respirator infection resistance. High sulfur dioxide (SO,) concentrations affect breathing and may aggravate existing respiratory and cardiovascular
disease. Particulate matter (PM) includes dust, dirt, soot, smoke and liquid droplets
directly emitted into the air by various sources. SO, and VOCs are also PM. Lead (Pb)
exposure can occur through inhalation of air and ingestion of Pb.' Excessive Pb exposure can cause seizures, mental retardation and/or behavioral disorders." [d.
177
See supra note 113.
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into the global warming phenomenon and the adverse impacts
of GHG emissions is abundant. 178 Therefore, it is possible to
assimilate generalized scientific data that supports the premise
that GHGs have the potential to reasonably endanger public
health or welfare. 179 GHG emission modeling shows that GHG
emissions, individually and aggregately, adversely effect the
environment.1 80 Scientists predict that if GHG emissions continue to rise, the natural environment will experience permanent alterations that will force biota to either adapt or face extinction. 181 Using these findings and predictions, a tenable argument exists that GHG emissions have the potential to reasonably endanger public health and welfare. 182
Although generalized global warming data is available,
specific studies on the ability of GHGs to reasonably endanger
public health or welfare are, nonetheless, lacking. While an
argument can be made that GHGs impact on global warming
has the potential to reasonably endanger public health or welfare, critics of global warming science will inevitably challenge
the validity of such data. 183 Furthermore, while numerous
studies suggest catastrophic impacts will result from global
warming, some studies suggest that global warming is a natural event that pre-dated anthropogenic GHGS.184 As the science of climate change remains an unsettled and contentious
arena in the United States, the express scientific support essential to identify a GHG as an air pollutant for regulation un-

See supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
FAQ, supra note 8.
1BO S2300-02, supra note 4 (statement by Sen. Kerry referencing a Dec. 1999 article).
181
Sheet 6, supra note 9. See also FAQ, supra note 8.
182 Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1055. The court will uphold the EPA's decision to add
a new constituent for air quality regulation so long as its adoption is based on reasonable extrapolations from some reliable evidence. Id.
183
See, e.g., S5291-01, supra note 54.
"" Ohio State Research: Viewpoint: Global Warming Natural May End Within 20
Years by Pam Frost Gorder, available at http://www.osu.edulresearchnewslarchive/
nowarm.htm (last modified June 14, 2001). Dr. Robert Essenhigh, E.G. Bailey Professor of Energy Conservation in Ohio State's Department of Mechanical Engineering,
believes that atmospheric CO 2 is not the cause of global warming. Id. Based on his
model, Dr. Essenhigh suggests the Earth may reach a peak in the current temperature
profile within the next ten to twenty years, and then it could begin to cool into a new
ice age. Id.
179

179
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der NAAQS is unfortunately unlikely found from existing climate change science. 185
However, if any of the six GHGs are capable of satisfying
the "reasonably endanger" requirement under NAAQS, the
identifiable and diverse source requirement could be easily
met. 186 GHG emission sources are diverse and identifiable.
The number of industries emitting GHGs into the atmosphere
is great.
Using C02 emission sources as an example, over 95 percent
of C02 is generated by fossil fuel combustion. This 95 percent
can be broken down as follows: 33 percent from electricity generation, 33 percent from transportation, 12 percent from direct
residential and commercial use, and 20 percent from industrial
use. IS7 The 33 percent of C02 emissions from transportation
can further be broken down: 13.9 percent from direct combustion of cars, 11.2 percent from direct combustion of trucks, 4.5
percent from direct combustion from airplanes, 1.8 percent
from direct combustion of ships, 0.6 percent from pipelines, and
0.8 percent from railroads. 188 The 12 percent of direct residential and commercial use can also further be broken down: 9.3
percent is attributed to gas and oil heating and cooling, 1.5 percent to gas water heating, and 1.2 percent to gas appliances. 189
Considering the statistical information on C02 emissions alone,
it is clear that C02 sources are both diverse and identifiable.
Therefore, there should be few, if any, obstacles to classifying
C02 as an identifiable and diverse source for purposes of
NAAQS.
C02 is a representative example of the other five GHGs. It
is unlikely that GHG regulation under NAAQS would be hindered by the inquiry as to whether the GHG sources are identifiable and diverse. The limiting factor, therefore, to regulating
1M See supra note 182. The court will uphold the EPA's decision to add a new constituent for air quality regulation so long as its adoption is based on reasonable extrapolations from some reliable evidence. [d.
!B6
See generally CRS Issue Brief for Congress IB97057: Global Climate Change:
Market-Based Strategies to Reduce Greenlwuse Gases by Larry Parker (April 4, 2001),
available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreportslClimate/clim-5.cfm (visited Jan. 2, 2002)
(outlining the identifiable sources of greenhouse gas emission sources).
IB1

[d.

188

[d.

189

[d.
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GHGs under NAAQS is the "reasonably endanger" factor,
which is ultimately at the discretion of the regulating agency.
When Congress developed the statutory language creating
NAAQS, GHGs emission issues were not yet contemplated.1 90
In light of the limiting statutory language, the ability to regulate GHGs under NAAQS is debatable. Unfortunately, the specific scientific data to convince the EPA that GHGs reasonably
endanger public health or welfare may not be available. The
connection between the data and environmental impacts is
likely too attenuated to warrant GHG regulation under
NAAQS.
B. CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES
PROGRAMS: A TEMPLATE FOR GHG EMISSION REGULATION
While regulating GHGs under NAAQS may not be appropriate due to the difficulty in meeting the "reasonably endanger" standard, Congress has the authority to promulgate a new
program to meet the challenge of global warming. The Title IV
program or the RECLAIM program may well be more suitable
templates for the development of a new program to regulate
domestic GHGs.

1. Title IV as a Template for Regulating GHGs
Title IV's establishment of allowances for fossil fuel electric
generating plants has been widely praised as "one of the most
successful environmental programs of the past decade."191 In
fact, EPA's Title IV program is responsible for 50 percent of the
total pollution reductions made in the last ten years. 192 Title
IV's noteworthy impact on pollution reduction stems from the
program's very design; a design based on market incentives,
namely the cap-and-trade system. 193 Of various mechanisms
100 See, e.g., 146 CONGo REC. H4823-02 (daily ed. June 21, 2000) (statement by Rep.
Knollenberg referencing a Legal Affairs Committee Report on CO. regulation that
stated "even though the most direct evidence shows that Congress did not intent that
EPA regulate CO.").
'9' Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An analysis of
the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10411, 10411 (1996).
'92 See supra note 134, at 162 .
•93 See, e.g., Byron Swift, Command without Control: Why Cap-and-Trade Should
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available to implement a GHG emission reduction and limitation program, Title IV's cap-and-trade approach for SOx seems
the most appropriate model. However, while the basic cap-andtrade approach should be used in creating a GHG emission reduction and limitation program, the Title IV program could
benefit from improvement.
Whereas Title IV relied on only two years worth of data to
develop the baseline, the GHG program should extend the
baseline period beyond two years in order to compile a more
accurate representation of emission productions. If the Title IV
allowances provision is adopted under a GHG program, the
method by which the allowances are established should also
incorporate more than a mere two years worth of data. 194 Furthermore, if ''bonus'' allowances are awarded under a GHG
program, a more restrictive method of distributing allowances
should be established. 195
Some aspects of Title IV do not, however, require improvement. Title IV requires new emission sources to purchase
their rights to emit from existing sources to ensure that the
maximum emission levels never increase beyond the maximum
cap.1 96 This concept should be included in a GHG program because, if properly implemented and enforced, GHG emissions
would never exceed the maximum cap that was established by
way of the baseline. Additionally, the concept of retiring emissions at the end of each year to reduce the overall cap should
also be used in a GHG program.1 97
The "trade" portion of the cap-and-trade program is also
essential. A GHG program should adopt the general concept of
Title IV's trading program for SOx, whereby parties buy, sell,
or hold emission rights. 198 While the general concept should be
Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10330, 10331 (discussion on Cap-and-Trade control of SOx).
194
Byron Swift, How Environmental Law Works: An analysis of the Utility Sector's
Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxides under the Clean Air
Act, 14 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 320. (2001).
195 [d. at 325.
Nearly 4 million bonus allowances were allocated during Phase I,
which ultimately resulted in a bank of 11.6 million allowances saved for use in Phase
II. [d. The allowance bank is not expected to be depleted until 2010. [d.
196
See, e.g., supra note 124.
197
[d.
198
See generally Clean Air Act, Title IV, §403, 42 § U.S.C. 7651b (2001) (outlining
the SOx allowance program).
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adopted, changes should be made to improve pollution reduction.
For instance, the ability to bank allowances should be limited and trading should be restricted in areas depending on the
location of the purchasing party. A limit should be placed on
the length of time that an allowance might be banked before it
is forfeited. While establishing a time limit for the retention of
allowances ensures emissions actually occur, it also accounts
for "paper emissions". As for placing a limitation on location of
trading, a GHG program will likely consist of six different regulated constituents originating from areas where the constituent
concentrations vary. First, parties should only be allowed to
trade like constituents - C02 for C02, not C02 for N02. Second,
a party should be limited to buying like constituents only from
geographical areas that have equal or greater emission levels
than that of the purchasing party. Third, trading should be
monitored to curtail bursts of emissions purchases in particular
areas where emission levels for the constituents are increasing
rapidly. Temporary trading freezes might be used to curtail
trading in "hot spots". 199
Overall, Title IV has proven how successful market-based
incentives environmental regulation can be when properly implemented and maintained. Moreover, there are additional
reasons why a GHG program should incorporate aspects of Title IV. First, the power industry has become accustomed to
operating under a cap-and-trade system and will easily adapt
to like regulation under a GHG program. Second, the Title IV
program produced results quickly: a 40 percent reduction in
emissions with over a two percent growth in product. 20o Third,
the Chicago Board of Trade Future Market already handles
trading of emissions. Fourth, the continuous monitoring system has already been developed for Title IV and can be modified for a GHG program. Finally, almost all of the data needed
to establish the maximum cap, allowance scheme, and trading
scheme already exists because of annual GHG emission inven-

199
See generally Byron Swift, Allowance Trading and SOx Hot Spots - Good News
from the Acid Rain Program, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 954 (2000). A hot spot is an area suffering from high levels of localized pollution. [d.
200
See supra note 146, at 237.
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tories. Thus, a similar market-based incentives approach for
GHG regulation would undoubtedly prove equally successful.

2. RECLAIM as a Template for Regulating GHGs
While the Title IV program was largely successful in reducing emissions, the RECLAIM program is a sharp contrast.
Since its inception, the RECLAIM program has failed miserably to lower NOx and SOx emissions. During the period of
1994 to 1996, while the projected pollution reductions were at
thirty percent for NOx, the actual reductions were ten percent
of the projected reductions: a mere three percent reduction in
NOx emissions. 201 NOx reductions prior to the inception of
RECLAIM were actually greater. In fact, over the four-year
period between 1989 and 1993, the LA Basin experienced a 37
percent reduction in NOx emissions. 202
Some of the reasons for RECLAIM's failure include fabricated paper reductions through industry overestimations, the
creation of pollution hot spots, and outright fraud and manipulation of emissions reporting. 203 The problems with RECLAIM
were evident from its inception. When introduced, many of the
regulated industries previously underestimating their emissions began to overestimate their emissions to ensure that they
had an emissions cushion. As a result, industries were able to
emit beyond levels previously allowed. Therefore, even though
RECLAIM recorded "reductions," they were merely paper reductions. 204
While SCAQMD's RECLAIM program exemplifies an unsuccessful market-based incentives program, not all marketbased incentives approaches should be discounted. 205 By thoroughly reviewing RECLAIM's failures, an entity interested in

201
Richard T. Drury, Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles'
Failed Experiments in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 231, 275 (1999).
See also Lethal Lessons, supra note 154.
202
Drury, supra note 201, at 265.
203 See, e.g., Lethal Lessons, supra note 158.
204
Drury, supra note 201, at 233 (referencing paper reduction as "phantom").
206 See generally CorpWatch: Srrwke and Mirrors - Will Global Pollution Trading
Save the Climate or Promote Injustice and Fraud? by Michael Belliveau (Oct. 1998),
available at http://www.igc.org/traclfeature/ciimate/pollution/belliveau.html (visited
Jan. 6, 2002).
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developing a market-based incentives program for GHGs will
avoid similar mistakes. For instance, a market-based incentives program for GHGs could benefit from RECLAIM's mistakes by ensuring that it incorporates a method by which industry reporting of emission productions is incapable of overestimation. This could be accomplished by comparing the values
reported to a baseline that uses a greater number of production
years. This could also be accomplished by having the regulating entity conduct "random" spot inventory inspections, thereby
assessing heavy civil and criminal liability for inaccurate reporting. Ideally, random spot inventories would serve as an
incentive to estimate emission productions more accurately and
would at the least reduce gross abuse of the reporting system.
The creation of pollution hot spots is another RECLAIM
failure worth avoiding. 206 This unfortunate phenomenon could
be avoided by placing trading freezes in areas where inordinate
amounts of emissions are purchased in short periods of time.
For example, if an emission source needs to purchase allowances, but the area where the source is located is experiencing
high levels of allowance purchases, the source would be restricted from purchasing any additional allowances. A source
confronting such a situation would have two choices: emit and
face a stiff penalty for non-compliance or reduce emissions. If
the non-compliance penalty were set at a level to severely discourage non-compliance, the source would reduce emissions.
Any GHG program premised on market-based incentives
and created in the wake of RECLAIM should develop a more
responsive system to avoid emission reporting fraud and manipulation. A few ways to avoid this problem include raising
non-compliance penalties, developing a networked emissions
reporting device that allows for spot-checking, and establishing
random full-scale intensive emission production evaluations.
Non-compliance penalty amounts could be set according to the
severity of the emission reporting error. The compliance penalties should allot greater penalties and liability for purposeful,
206
However, the issue of a pollution hot spot may not even be a concern for a GHG
program because the levels of emissions needed to have the potential to adversely
affect human health or the environment may not even be reached. Additional data is
needed to determine if a GHG emission hot spot is even possible.
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excess emission production. A spot-check system should further be developed to allow networking between the regulated
entity and the emission sources. Under this network, the
emission sources could only transmit emission data, whereas
the regulating entity would have access to spot check emission
data and make comparisons to determine whether to conduct a
site visit. The third possibility for controlling fraud and manipulation would simply be to notify the emission sources that
they always run the risk of being subject to a random spot inspection. This spot inspection would consist of a site visit
where a full-blown emissions production evaluation would be
performed. The evaluation would entail the sampling of emission production to determine the actual emission production of
the sources along with an examination of the sources' processes. The process evaluations are necessary to determine
which, if any, process modifications have occurred and whether
those modifications were accounted for when reporting emission production.
By examining the inadequacies of the program and implementing the alternatives listed above, RECLAIM will be an
invaluable tool for the creation of a new market-based incentives GHG program. Through the careful considerations of the
program's shortcomings, improved monitoring mechanisms will
be developed, stricter compliance and enforcement mechanisms
will be established, and trading restrictions will be enforced.
These improvements to SCAQMD's RECLAIM program will
serve as important and powerful tools in developing and implementing an effective GHG reduction and limitation program.
C. MARKET-BASED INCENTNES: THEORY

Turning from the analyses of the existing emission reduction programs and their suitability to regulate GHGs, it is important to determine whether a GHG program premised on
market-based incentives is appropriate. Proponents of marketbased incentives programs consider the approach to be more
than merely a cost-effective way to meet environmental regulations; proponents believe the approach spurs innovative technologies to prevent pollution while increasing industry efficiency. Opponents of market-based incentives, however, fIrmly
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contend they do exactly the opposite. 207 According to scholar
David Driesen, a market-based incentives program stifles innovation by using a "cheap fIx."208 The "cheap fIx" Driesen
complains of is the purchase of emission allowances in lieu of
investing that same money in new technology.209 Even if a
company decides to use Driesen's "cheap fix" approach, however, allowances are not infInite. Eventually, allowances will
run out and all companies will have no choice but to reduce
emissions. Companies are aware of the consequences of abusing a market-based incentives program, as shown through the
success of EPA's Title IV program. An overwhelming majority
of companies regulated under Title IV implemented process
changes, refIned the use of raw materials, and developed new
pollution control technology.21o
Another point of contention with the market-based incentives approach to environmental regulation is public exclusion
from the industrial pollution decision-making process. 211 Some
opponents focus on the potential for a non-consenting member
of the public to endure increased pollution because a company
chooses to purchase allowances rather than reduce emissions. 212 While the public might not have choices regarding
increased pollution, this problem is certainly not unique to
market-based incentives. Technology-based limitations in traditional command and control regulation also have the potential to result in increased pollution. The only difference with
technology-based limitations is that increased pollution is a
result of a permit variance, a violation, or grandfather clause,
rather than at the discretion of industry.
In addition, market-based incentives regulations often increase the public's participation in the regulatory process. As
pointed out by proponents Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart, market-based incentives regulation requires an overall pollution maximum (a cap) that forces the publi~ to consider the
See generally, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14
300 (1995).
2<l8
David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix: The Emission Trading Idea and the
Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. I, 18 (1998).
209 Id.
210
See supra note 193, at 10331 (footnotes 23-28).
211
Drury, supra note 201, at 278.
212
See generally Heinzerling, supra note 207.
2fY1

STAN. ENvrL. L.J.
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valuation of environmental protection. 213 Furthermore, in an
effective market-based incentives regulatory scheme, the public
can directly impact pollution levels of pollution by purchasing
emissions and retiring them. This direct participation in purchase and retirement of emission allowances is a feature
unique to market-based incentives regulatory schemes. Short
of filing a lawsuit, the traditional command and control approach to environmental regulation does not offer such a powerful tool for the public to directly impact industrial pollution.
Moreover, the typical lobby influences implicit to the command
and control rule-making process, issuance of permits, and requests for variances are eliminated. 214 Improper influence
cannot adversely affect the ability of a company to comply with
an established pollution cap. At least in this respect, a marketbased incentives regulatory scheme is superior to the traditional command and control technology-based regulatory
schemes. 215
Because market-based incentives programs give involved
parties choices as to how to implement the emissions reductions and limitations, compliance is often much less expensive
than mandates under command and control regulations. Welldesigned market-based incentives programs reward people and
companies that grow in an efficient manner. In the end, the
market-based incentives meet both economic and environmental needs. 216
While market-based incentives may be an effective alternative to the traditional command and control approach to environmental regulation, if improperly implemented and maintained, they will fail to reduce pollution. 217 If poorly designed
and ineffectively implemented and maintained, the program
will also fail to spur innovation and may well lead to increased
pollution and corruption. Therefore, a market-based incentives

213
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 189 (1988).
214
CaBS R. SunBtein, Administrative Substance, 41 DUKE L.J. 607, 636 (1991)
2.., See generally CaBS R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 41 DUKE L.J. 607, 636
(1991).
21.
100 Ways, supra note 159.
217 See generally Drury, supra note 201.
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approach can successfully reduce pollution only if the program
is properly implemented and maintained. 218
Successful market-based incentives approaches must effectively address program design, implementation, enforcement,
and accurate monitoring. 219 Potential pitfalls include inflated
baseline emission levels, low credit prices, paper emission reductions, manipulation, and outright fraud. 220 For these reasons, existing environmental regulatory programs developed
under a market-based incentives approach have been both successful and unsuccessful. As previously discussed, the EPA's
CAA Title IV for Acid Rain was successful for these reasons
whereas California's SCAQMD's RECLAIM was not.
In spite of anticipated criticism from opponents, a marketbased incentives program is the most appropriate approach to
the domestic regulation of GHG emissions. The sources of
GHGs are primarily industrial and industry tends to respond
more favorably to monetary incentives and efficiency. As such,
a market-based incentives program would drive industries to
become more environmentally efficient through a monetary
incentive. Under this type of program, domestic GHG emissions would inevitably stabilize. Stabilization is the first step
towards permanent GHG emissions reductions.
V. PROPOSAL

Despite the Untied States' unwillingness to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol as written, the United States is nonetheless
equipped to respond to global warming. Under a domestic
GHG emission reduction and limitation program, the perceived
unfair treatment of industrialized countries in complying with
GHG regulation would be irrelevant. In addition, by basing the
GHG program on market-based incentives, the potentially adverse economic impact on the United States could be dramatically reduced. 221 Furthermore, since the United States is cur218 See, e.g., supra note 199.
... CRS Report for Congress 98-563: Air Quality and Emission Trading: An Overview of Current Issues by David M. Bearden (Aug. 16, 1999), available at
http://www.cnie.orgINLE/CRSreportslAir/air-27.cfm (visited on Jan. 2, 2002).
220
See generally Drury, supra note 201.
.., Cf Bush Position, supra note 1, at 12-13. The report states that the "Kyoto Protocol fails to establish long term goals based on science, poses serious and unnecessary
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rently responsible for over twenty percent of the world's GHG
emissions, a domestic program regulating GHG emissions
would undoubtedly reduce the alarming rate at which global
warming is occurring. 222
Considering EPA's NAAQS is likely inappropriate for regulating domestic GHGs, a new program is necessary. The EPA's
Title IV and California's RECLAIM programs were also developed when existing, traditional command and control regulation was either an unsuccessful or an inappropriate means to
achieve regulatory compliance. 223 The following is a proposed
national GHG emission reduction and limitation program,
modeled on Title IV and RECLAIM and premised on marketbased incentives.
A. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION CONTROL INITIATIVE

A number of factors can influence the effectiveness of a
market-based incentives approach to environmental regulation,
especially when attempting to fashion an effective GHG emission program from the cap-and-trade approach of market-based
incentives. The three primary criteria, however, include pollution ownership, pollution valuation, and pollution control flexibility. First, an "owner" of the emissions must be determined. 224 The owner should be the party with the most direct
control over the generation of the emissions. Second, it is essential to develop a mechanism to allow the owner of the emissions to buy and sell emissions as the party would any other
property. 225 Third, the owner should have enough flexibility
and authority over its emissions to determine how best to reduce or eliminate them. 226 The government's role in this process should be minimal as owners of the emissions have the

risks to the US and world economies and is ineffective in addressing climate change
because it excludes major parts of the world." [d.
222 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Press Kit - The
Hague 2000, available at http://www. unfccc.int.htmi (last modified June 21, 2001). The
Unites States has experienced an 11.2% increase in Carbon Dioxide emissions between
1990 and 1998. [d. Cf Bush Position, supra note 1, at 3l.
223 See generally, e.g., Swift, supra note 123.
224
100 Ways, supra note 159.
225
226

[d.
[d.
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most knowledge of their particular process for emission reduction purposes. 227
Once the initial criteria have been adequately defined, the
next step is to establish the fundamental aspects of the program. The fundamental aspects of the GHG Emission Control
Initiative include the location of the emissions and owners, the
quantity of allowable emissions, the necessary compliance and
enforcement requirements, and the market incentives. Specifically, the program design will hinge on defining the geographic
areas to regulate, identifying an emission cap, allowing emission trading, determining a compliance regime, and establishing non-compliance penalties. 228

1. The Program Criteria
a. Establishing Ownership of Pollution
To establish who owns the pollution, it is imperative to
look at the sources of the GHG emissions. A number of categories of sources within the United States are responsible for
producing GHG emissions. The easiest sources to identify,
based on current data, are the industrial sources. Industrial
source categories already exist and are used to compile annual
United States GHG emission reports and other air pollution
regulation data. 229
The next step is to identify the individual producers of
GHG emissions within a given source category.230 Using the
chemical industry as an example, this program should rely on
facility specific process flow designs produced by process engineers for production purposes. These process flow designs
could identify whether GHG emissions were produced through
the source's process. Mter a positive determination as to GHG
emission production, the facility would be identified as a GHG

[d.
See supra note 219.
229
See generally National Technology Information Service Web Site Home Page, at
http://www.ntis.gov (visited Feb. 24, 2002). Industrial Source Categories are referred to
as Standard Industry Classification ("SIC") codes. [d. SICs are promulgated by the
National Technical Information Service. [d.
230
[d.
227

228
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emISSIOn source. Following this identification, the facility
would be designated as a GHG owner.
Understanding that the chemical industry is not the only
known source category for GHGs, the other identified GHG
source categories would need to undergo a similar evaluation
process. As for the appropriate party to oversee the evaluation
process, there are a few choices. The federal government,
through an overseeing regulatory agency such as the EPA,
could employ and train individuals to properly assess various
process flows. This would likely be extremely expensive and
federal employees may be less equipped to make judgments
regarding the emission of GHGs than those technical individuals in the particular fields within the specific facilities.
Another option is for the federal government to hire experts from the field to complete the evaluations. While this
method would reduce training-associated costs and likely produce more technically sound evaluations, the overall costs
would be comparable with, if not higher than, hiring and training government employees. Contracting experts could result in
substantial expenses because the government would have to
pay an expert for his or her skills. Additionally, depending on
the experts' particular industrial or political alignment, contracting field experts might not provide unbiased evaluation
results. 231
An equally effective and less expensive method of source
identification is allowing the source to make the determination.
Technical employees of the particular field in a specific facility,
such as a facility process engineer or a plant design engineer,
would be able to identify its facility as a GHG owner in a more
efficient manner than those discussed above. Obviously, this
solution, while cost effective, raises concerns that a facility may
misrepresent its status with regard to self-identification as a
GHG owner. To alleviate such a concern, a regulatory agency
simply imposes civil and/or criminal liability on an owner for
fraud or misrepresentation.
Industrial sources are not the only sources of GHG emissions. It is extremely difficult, however, to adequately identify
.., A way to counter the potential for bias in the completion of the evaluations is to
impose significant civil and criminal liabilities for misrepresentation.
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non-industrial sources of GHG emissions and their actual
emission levels. Moreover, industrial sources are currently
responsible for a majority of GHG emissions, making a regulatory scheme that limits and reduces industrial GHG emissions
most appropriate and most effective.
b. Associating a Value with the Pollution
Mter identifying industrial sources of GHGs and establishing GHG ownership, the program must assign a monetary
value to the emissions in order to give the owners an incentive
to comply with the program. Since the emissions are reported
numerically for the annual GHG emission reports, assigning a
monetary value based upon a quantitative reporting volume is
most appropriate. The cost association should not be too cumbersome, but should still be high enough to be effective.
Because other market-based incentives programs have settled on a dollar amount for a specific quantity of emissions, the
GHG program could easily build from the other programs'
valuation of a specific quantity of emissions. 232 In keeping, the
quantity of emissions should be set at a "per ton" value by the
agency overseeing the program. 233 The value for a ton of GHG
emissions must be such that the GHG owner realizes the value
of what they "own". To accomplish this, the G HG program
should establish a per-ton monetary incentive in both the form
of a reward and a punishment.
The overseeing agency will need to set up the trading program to establish reward and punishment incentives. A system similar to the CAA's Title IV trading program would work
wonderfully here. 234 The Chicago Board of Trade could easily
serve as a trading ground for the monetary value of a GHG
emissions ton.

232
Clean Air Act, Title IV, §409, 42 U.S.C. §7651j (2001). Under the CAA's Title IV
Acid Rain Program, regulated entities found in non-compliance are assessed a $2,000
fine for each ton. [d.
233 In order to establish a monetary value for a ton of GHG emissions, sufficient
research must be completed to ensure that the value is not too low and not too high.
... Supra note 232.
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c. Flexibility in Pollution Control
Allowing the GHG owner flexibility in how to comply with
the program's cap is also an important aspect of ensuring the
success of the program. Again, the source is probably the most
equipped in determining various methods to meet the maximum cap set by the program. These facilities employ individuals that possess technological expertise. Design engineers,
process engineers, and many others are capable of developing
technology to reduce their facility's production of GHG emisSIOns.
While the technology required to reduce emissions may not
currently exist, implementation of this program would facilitate technological advances. In addition, industry is already
aware of the issue of global warming through the emergence of
global warming science and the United States' involvement in
the development of the Kyoto Protocol. 235 Many industries
have begun to explore methods by which to reduce the production of various GHGS.236
One method to help facilitate the initial development of
clean technology in various industry source categories would be
to sponsor workshops and seminars.237 These workshops and
235
See, e.g., Planet Ark News Search Results - World Environment News: US Energy Companies Propose Carbon Dioxide Emissions Caps (December 7,2001), available
at http://www.planetark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=11519 (visited Jan. 2,
2002). (Statement by PSEG Power President Frank Cassidy at a US Senate hearing on
Tuesday, Dec. 4, 2001). Mr. Cassidy stated, "Members of our coalition share the view
that the scientific evidence on climate change has progressed to the point where prudent action on reducing greenhouse gas emissions is warranted. [d.
236
S2300-02, supra note 4 (statement by Sen. Kerry). Sen. Kerry stated "Fortunately, more and more companies are stepping forward to solve this problem and lead
the way where government won't. BP will reduce its emission to ten percent below its
1990 levels by 2010. Polaroid will cut its emissions to twenty percent below 1994 levels
by 2005. Johnson & Johnson will reduce its emissions to seven percent below 1990
levels by 2010. mM will cut emissions by four percent each year till 2004 based on
1994 emissions. And, Shell International, DuPont, Suncor Energy Inc., Ontario Power
Generation have all made similar commitments." [d. See also Taking the Heat - Why
Bush is Right on Kyoto - Treaty or Not, US Needs to Curb Greenhouse Gas, NEWSDAY,
Jul. 29, 2001 at Currents and Books: Cover editorial (explaining that Major corporations such as Shell, BP and DuPont have entered into agreements with the Environmental Defense organization to reduce emissions). Major auto makers here and abroad
are also contemplating reducing emissions, not out of great concern for global warming,
but because it will eventually make operations more efficient and ease their dealings
with European governments. [d.
237 Relying on seminars and workshops as one method to facilitate innovative tech-
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seminars would be held at various locations throughout the
nation and would be industrial source category specific. The
focus should be on the engineering aspects of improving processes to reduce GHG emissions.
Workshops and seminars would facilitate the interaction of
a number of highly qualified experts in their respective fields,
whereby they could discuss various experimental methods for
reducing GHG emissions. Moreover, the forging of important
partnerships would occur, resulting in research and development for new technologies to reduce GHG emissions in specific
industrial processes. In addition to the innovation that would
occur at such seminars and workshops, agency personnel would
also be educated in the various industrial processes while forming closer relationships with those very industries, thereby furthering the cooperation necessary for achieving GHG emission
reduction and limitation.

2. The Program Design
a. Establishing the Geographic Area of Regulation
For a truly effective domestic GHG emission reduction and
limitation program that can slow the global warming trend, the
program must regulate GHGs throughout the. entire nation.
EPA's prior experience overseeing other national air programs
will be beneficial in the implementation of regulations for the
GHG Emission Control Initiative.
Dividing the country into different categorical areas is necessary to ensure that the GHG program is effective and efficient. This division is necessary because GHG production in
certain areas of the country is greater than in other areas of
the country. Moreover, because there are existing emission
categories for air pollutants under NAAQS, the GHG emission
categories could easily merge into the existing system. 238 Asnology to reduce and limit GHG emissions would require some funding from the agency
overseeing the program. Such funding should be made available because the initial
agency investment in such workshops and seminars would be invaluable as it relates to
environmental compliance with a domestic program to reduce and limit GHG emissions.
238 See generally Untied States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards: Nonattainment Areas for Criteria Pollutants, available at
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suming, however, that the GHG Emission Control Initiative
opts to establish three divisions instead of the five divisions
outlined in NAAQS, they could simply be "minimal", "moderate," and "extreme". 239 Each of these divisions would be specific
to each individual GHG.
The emission division categories will assist in determining
if a trading freeze is necessary to avoid creating a GHG emission hot spot in a particular area. Additionally, special designations should be applied to GHG emissions within areas
deemed to encompass important ecological sites, such as national parks. The special designation would simply serve as a
"marker" for regulatory agencies to acknowledge that a GHG
emission source is located within an environmentally sensitive
area.
b. Identifying an Emissions Cap
The development of a baseline is necessary to identify an
emissions cap for the GHG Emission Control Initiative. The
United States already has information regarding the national
domestic production of GHG emissions. That data helped establish the enumerated GHG emission reduction and limitation
commitments found in the Kyoto ProtocoJ.240 Since compilation
of the data is complete, utilization of that same data would be
cost effective and efficient .. The information compiled for and
submitted to the FCCC on April 11, 2000 considered the years
1990 through 1998. 241 Reliance on an eight-year period of time
is adequate to establish a baseline. Moreover, if the United
http://www.epa.gov/oar/ oaqps/greenbk/o3co.html (last modified Mar. 6, 2002) (listing
the various types of designated classifications for criteria pollutants).
239 An area of the country identified as "minimal" would be an area of the country
where, in relation with the rest of the country, contributes only a small amount ofGHG
emissions. A "moderate" area would be a part of the country that contributes an average amount of GHG emissions to the atmosphere as compared the rest of the country.
The "extreme" designated areas would be those parts of the county responsible for the
greatest volume ofGHG emissions.
240
Kyoto, supra note 61.
241 See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Emissions Data, available at http://www.unfccc.intlresourcelghgistatrep2000.html(visited Jan. 2,
2002) [hereinafter Emissions Datal. See also United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change: United States Emission Data, available at http://www.unfccc.intl
resourcelghgistatrepOO/usaOO.pdf(visited Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter United States Emission
Datal.
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States uses the same scientific formulas and scientific data the
rest of the international community is using under the Kyoto
Protocol, it will face less criticism for opting out of the international amendment.
By taking the average emission production for each GHG
over the eight-year period, a maximum cap could be established. Although the values have fluctuated over the eight
years, they have not differed drastically from year to year.242
As a result, industry would have time to adjust while establishing some actual reduction in GHG emissions. While the initial
maximum cap for each GHG would be based on the eight-year
period, it should not be the final cap. Ideally, subsequent caps
will be for a period of ten years, but no longer than fifteen
years. By the end of that ten-year period, the maximum cap for
each GHG should be equal to the lowest total value reported for
each GHG over the initial 8-year period. The final cap should
be rigid and unchanging. 5-year periodic reviews conducted by
the overseeing regulatory agency would allow for modification
to the final cap under specific circumstances.
c. Determining a Compliance Regime
For the GHG Emission Control Initiative to be successful,
compliance with both the 8-year max and the final cap is imperative. To establish an effective compliance regime, the program will need a continuous monitoring program. The monitoring program must be capable of identifying non-compliant
industries. Furthermore, to ensure an effective compliance
regime, non-compliant industries will incur stiff civil and/or
criminal liability for non-compliance.
Monitoring GHG emissions, as seen in many industrial
settings, is not easy to accomplish and many of the numbers
gathered originate from estimates or projections. 243 Although
models are available to project the production of emissions of
various constituents, the projections do not reflect the actual
... Emissions Data, supra note 24l.
... See generally Untied States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards: Air Quality Monitoring, available at http://www.epa.gov/
oar/oaqps/modeling.html (last modified Sept. 6, 2001) (listing the various types of
models for air quality purposes).
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emissions entering the atmosphere. One way to effectuate actual continuous monitoring is to set up a sampling program.
Sampling for actual air constituent emissions is time consuming and expensive, but ultimately necessary to ensure that the
GHG program is actually meeting its goal.
The EPA has a number of approved methods for conducting air emission sampling for monitoring purposes. 244 Using
one of these methods for guidance, a similar EPA-approved
method could apply to GHG emission monitoring. A uniform
sampling method would be required. The data obtained
through sampling would further require transmission to a data
collection center for GHG emission compilation. The data collection center would automatically post GHG emissions, which
would connect directly to the trading mechanism for establishing the value of the GHG emissions. Depending on the reported emissions, the value for a ton of GHG emissions would
change accordingly.
While a data collection center would store the sampling results for overall compilation, individual sources would maintain their own tallies. Between the two systems established for
storing data, the GHG owners would receive notification when
they were close to reaching their established GHG emission cap
for the year. Notification would occur three times: first, when
the GHG owner was at its 75 percent GHG emission point, next
when the GHG owner was at its 90 percent GHG emission
point, and finally when the GHG owner reaches its emission
cap. Upon notification that the GHG owner has reached its 100
percent emission point, the owner would be issued an administrative compliance order instructing the owner that it could
purchase available GHG emission rights from other GHG owners or incur a fine for each ton of GHGs emitted in excess of its
total emission right. To establish the fine amount, the overseeing agency would rely on adequate data related to the economical value of emission rights. The value outlined in Title IV - a
penalty of $2000 for each ton emitted beyond that authorized would be both appropriate and adequate. 245

244 See generally, e.g., 40 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. E (1989) (National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Compliance Procedure Methods).
245
See supra note 234.
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In addition to receiving a fine for exceeding the established
GHG emission cap for the year, the GHG owner would receive
further penalties. The following year, the GHG owner would
lose its right to emit the amount of tons emitted beyond its
emission cap that the owner failed to purchase from another
GHG owner.246 Realizing that failure to purchase emissions
rights or remain within its emission limits will result in the
loss of the right to emit in the future will ideally motivate compliance.
d. Emission Trading
Once the emission cap is in place for each GHG, the overseeing regulatory agency will distribute an initial number of
emission allowances to the existing regulated GHG emission
sources. The initial number of allowances distributed should
be sufficient to ensure a viable market for trading. However,
the allowances should not be so extensive as to allow the GHG
emissions sources to simply hold them without making process
modifications, closing facilities, or instituting new pollution
control technology to achieve compliance with the cap.
Mter establishing the proper number of initial allowances
for the existing GHG sources, the regulatory agency will oversee emission purchases by new GHG emission sources. With a
maximum cap in place and the emission allowances issued to
existing sources, new sources must purchase GHG emission
allowances from existing sources. Placing this limitation on
new sources will force industry to develop methods to reduce
GHG emissions if a new GHG emission source in that same
industry is to be built. In limited circumstances, a new source
should be able to petition the overseeing agency for allowances
based upon its industrial process design. If a new industrial
source has developed a novel method to limit GHG emission
production through their process, the overseeing regulatory
agency may, at its discretion, grant "experimental" emission
allowances to this source. Removing the number of "experimental" allowances for allocation from the accumulated noncompliance allowances could facilitate this. Recall that a GHG
... See supra note 136 (a similar plan was used here).
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emission source that violates its emission limit loses its right to
emit the number of tons of GHGs it was unable to purchase
from the market. 247 Obviously, a grant of experimental allowances will not occur until non-compliance allowances accumulate tttrough enforcement actions.
In addition to a new source's ability to purchase allowances
or receive experimental allowances, all GHG emission sources
should have the ability to bank allowances for future use.
Nonetheless, the overseeing regulatory agency should impose a
five-year limit on the length of time available to bank the allowances before a source would forfeit them. A five-year period
is appropriate because it would coincide with five-year permitting and emission review cycles. 248 While establishing a fiveyear limit on banking encourages trading and emission production, the emission reductions would be more accurate because
they would be actual, rather than paper, reductions. Additionally, with the eventual lowering of the GHG emission cap and
the retirement of allowances, forcing the sale or forfeiture of
allowances after a five-year period would not increase overall
GHG emission production.
Another way to lower GHG emission production through
trading is to allow non-industrial sources to purchase allowances for retirement. For instance, an environmental group
could purchase GHG emission allowances through the market.
Once the group purchased the allowances and "retired" them,
the allowances would never return to the market. By establishing a discount rate for the purchase of GHG emissions by
non-industrial entities, the program would facilitate GHG
emission retirement. However, monitoring of the number of
discounted allowances offered annually for direct retirement is
important. Making five percent of the overall allowances available for retirement would be appropriate for the first five years
of the program. Thereafter, the overseeing regulatory agency
would review and revise the percentage of emissions available
2<, See supra note 136. See also supra note 246 accompanying text.
.... See generally Untied States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards: Title V Operating Permits, available at http://www.epa.
gov/oar/oaqps/permits.htmi (last modified Aug. 3, 2001) (general explanation of a Title
V operating permit). See also Clean Air Act Title V, §502, 42 U.S.C. §7661a(b)(5)(B)
(2001) (permits shall not be issued for more than a five-year period).
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for retirement as necessary to ensure that the market stays
viable.
Additionally, under certain circumstances, the overseeing
regulatory agency should invoke freezes on trading to ensure
market viability as well as emissions stabilization and reduction. By monitoring the purchasing and selling of emission allowances to certain geographical areas, the overseeing regulatory agency will significantly limit, or possibly eliminate, the
growth of GHG emission hot spots. By freezing the sale of allowances to a particular industrial area, GHG emission sources
will have to modify production or face non-compliance penalties. In hot spots, non-compliance penalties should be more
severe to encourage industry to modify production over incurring non-compliance penalties.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kyoto Protocol was proposed to meet the FCCC objective of stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the global climate. While the United States has decided
not to move forward with the ratification and implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol, a domestic GHG regulatory program that
relies on market-based incentives would be an effective tool to
address climate change issues at a domestic leveL Considering
the current political platform for environmental issues in the
United States, a market-based incentives approach to GHG
reduction and limitation may actually provide a successful
compromise between industrial and environmental concerns.
Implementing a program such as the GHG Emission Control
Initiative would help to slow the global warming process. Ideally, the program would have lasting technological effects on
industry, perhaps as significant as the development of the catalytic converter was to car manufacturing.
Furthermore, implementing a domestic GHG emission reduction and limitation program, such as the GHG Emission
Control Initiative, would help re-establish the United States as
a contentious player in innovative environmental reform initiatives. As the rest of the international community moves forward with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the
United States is likely to experience various forms of interna-
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tiona! social and economic backlash for failing to participate.
The international backlash could be reduced, if not eliminated,
by the adoption of a domestic program that would meet the objectives of the FCCC.
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VII.

APPENDIX:

KYOTO PROTOCOL RATIFICATION STATUS249

COUNTRY

ANTIGUA & BARBUDA
ARGENTINA
AUSTRALIA*
AUSTRIA*
AZERBAIJAN
BAHAMAS
BANGLADESH
BARBADOS
BELGIUM*
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
BULGARIA*
BURUNDI
CANADA*
CHILE
CHINA
COLUMBIA
COOK ISLANDS
COSTA RICA
CROATIA*
CUBA
CZECH REPUBLIC*
CYPRUS
DENMARK*
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
ESTONIA·
EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY*
FIGI
FINLAND*
FRANCE*
GAMBIA
GEORGIA
GERMANY*
GREECE*
GUATEMALA
GUINEA
HONDURAS

SIGNATURE

RATIFICATION
OR ACCESSION

03/16/98
03/16/98
04/29/98
04/29/98

11/03/98 (R)
09/28/01 (R)
05/31/02
09/28/00
04/09/99
10/22/01
08/07/00

REMARKS

(R)
(Ac)
(Ac)
(Ac)
(Ac)

04/29/98
07/09/98
04/29/98
09/18/98

02/25/02 (Ac)
11/30/99 (R)

10/18/01 (Ac)
04/29/98
06/17/98
OS/29/98
09/16/98
04/27/98
03/11199
03/15/99
11/23/98

11/30/01 (Ac)
08/27/01 (R)

(4)

04/30/02 (R)
11/15/01 (Ap)
07/16/99 (Ac)

04/29/98
01/15/99
03/15/99
06/08/98

02/12/02 (Ac)
01/13/00 (R)
11130/98 (R)
08/16/00 (Ac)

12/03/98
04/29/98
09/17/98
04/29/98
04/29/98

04/29/98
04/29/98
07110/98
02/25/99

05/31102 (Ap)
09/17/98 (R)
05/31102 (R)
05/31/02 (Ap)
06/01/01 (Ac)
06/16/99 (Ac)
05/31102 (R)
05/31102 (R)
10/05/99 (R)
09/07/00 (Ac)
07/19/00 (R)

(1)

(2)

... See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol
Ratification Status, available at http://unfccc.intiresource/kpstats.pdf (last updated
June 4, 2002).
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SIGNATURE

INDONESIA
IRELAND*
ISRAEL
ITALY*
JAMAICA
ITALY*
JAMAICA
JAPAN*
KAZAKHSTAN
KIRIBATI
LATVIA*
LESOTHO
LIECHTENSTEIN*
LITHUANIA*
LUXEMBOURG*
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
MALDIVES
MALI
MALTA
MARSHALL ISLANDS
MAURITIUS
MEXICO
MICRONESIA (STATES)
MONACO*
MONGOLIA
MOROCCO
NAURU
NETHERLANDS*
NEW ZEALAND*
NICARAGUA
NIGER
NIUE
NORWAY*
PALAU
PANAMA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND*
PORTUGAL*
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
ROMANIA*
RUSSIAN FEDERATION*
SAINT LUCIA
SAINT VINCENT AND
THE GRENADINES
SAMOA
SENEGAL
SEYCHELLES
SLOVAKIA*
SLOVENIA*
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07/13/98
04/29/98
12/16/98
04/29/98
04/29/98
04/28/98
03/12/99

RATIFICATION
OR ACCESSION

05/31/02 (R)
05/31/02
06/28/99
05/31/02
06/28/99
06/04/02

749

REMARKS

(3)

(R)
(Ac)
(R)
(Ac)
(At)

09/07/00 (Ac)

(6)

12/14/98
09/06/00 (Ac)
06/29/98
09/21/98
04/29/98
03/12/99
03/16/98
01127199
04/17/98
03117/98
06/09/98
03/17/98
04/29/98

04/29/98
05/22/98
07/07/98
10/23/98
12/08/98
04/29/98
06/08/98
03/02/99
08/25/98
11/13198
04/15/98
07/15/98
04/29/98
09/25/98
01105/99
03/11/99
03/16/98
03/19/98
03/16/98
03/20/98
02/26/99
10/21198

05/31102 (R)
01126/01 (Ac)
12/30/98 (R)
03/28/02 (R)
11111/01 (R)
05/09/01
09/07/00 (R)
06/21199 (R)
12/15/99
01125102
08/16/01
05/31/02

(Ac)
(Ac)
(R)
(Ac)

11118199 (R)
05/06/99
05/30/02
12/10/00
03/05/99
03/28/02
08/27/99

(R)
(R)
(Ac)
(R)
(R)
(R)

(5)

05/31/02 (Ap)
03/19/01 (R)

11127100 (R)
07/20/01 (Ac)
05/31/02 (R)
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COUNTRY

SIGNATURE

SOLOMON ISLANDS
SPAIN*
SWEDEN*
SWITZERLAND*
THAILAND
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
TURKMENISTAN
TUVALU
UKRAINE*
UNITED KINGDOM
AND IRELAND*
UNITED STATES*
URUGUAY
UZBEKISTAN
VANUATU
VIET NAM
ZAMBIA
TOTALS

09/29/98
04/29/98
04/29/98

RATIFICATION
OR ACCESSION

REMARKS

05/31/02 (R)
05/31/02 (R)

03/16/98

02/02/99
01107/99
09/28/98
11/16/98
03/15/99

01128/99 (R)
01111100 (R)
11/16/98 (R)

04/29/98

05/31102 (R)

11/12/98
07/29/98

02/05/01 (R)

12/0398
11120/98

10/12/99 (Ac)
07/17/01 (Ac)

08/05/98

84

74

Notes: R = Ratification; At = Acceptance; Ap = Approval; Ac = Accession
* Represents an Annex 1 Party
(1) European Community: "The European Community and its Member States
will fulfill their respective commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1, of the
Protocol jointly in accordance with the provisions of Article 4."
(2)France: "The French Republic reserves the right, in ratifying the Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, to
exclude its Overseas Territories from the scope of the Protocol."
(3)Ireland: "The European Community and the member States, including
Ireland, will fulfill their respective commitments under Article 3, paragraph
1, of the Protocol in accordance with the provisions of Article 4."
(4)Cook Islands: "The Government of the Cook Islands declares its understanding that signature and subsequent ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any rights under international
law concerning State responsibility for the adverse effects of the climate
change and that no provision in the Protocol can be interpreted as derogating
from principles of general international law. In this regard, the Government
of the Cook Islands further declares that, in light of the best available scientific information and assessment on climate change and its impacts, it considers the emissions reduction obligation in Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol to
be inadequate to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system".
(5)Niue: "The Government of Niue declares its understanding that ratification of the Kyoto Protocol shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any
rights under international law concerning state responsibility for the adverse
effects of climate change and that no provisions in the Protocol can be interpreted as derogating from the principles of general international law. In this
regard, the Government of Niue further declares that, in light of the best
available scientific information and assessment of climate change and im-
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pacts, it considers the emissions reduction obligations in Article 3 of the
Kyoto Protocol to be inadequate to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system".
(6)Kiribati: "The Government of the Republic of Kiribati declares its understanding that accession to the Kyoto Protocol shall in no way constitute a
renunciation of any rights under international law concerning State responsibility for the adverse effects of.the climate change and that no provision in
the Protocol can be interpreted as derogating from principles of general internationallaw."
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